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Abstract
Exports from China have surged substantially since its accession to the World
Trade Organization in 2001. We investigate how this expansion affected income
inequality within European regions by separating the trade pressure experienced
in external and domestic markets, as well as exploring the importance of several
economic mechanisms. Despite some intermediate adjustments, softening the in-
fluence of Chinese pressure and even facilitating European exports, we establish
a significant increase of inequality that is concentrated mostly in the lower part
of regional income distributions. We determine a significant channeling of the
trade pressure to income inequality through the shrinking manufacturing sector,
the increasing unemployment rate, and the technological upgrade of manufac-
turing exports, together with an increasing demand for better-qualified labor.
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1 Introduction
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the end of 2001 and the
ensuing acceleration of its foreign trade activity constitute a unique trade liberaliza-
tion episode, whose potential effect on industrialized Western countries has attracted
considerable attention. Related research on labor market effects has taken off with
the seminal regional study of Autor et al. (2013), which found falling wages and em-
ployment in affected local labor markets in the United States (US). More recently, the
sector-level analysis of Pierce and Schott (2016) found adverse employment effects rein-
forced through input-output linkages, which Acemoglu et al. (2016) confirmed using a
combined regional and sectoral approach. Autor et al. (2016) provides a comprehensive
view of the further corroborating evidence, emphasizing increasing wage inequality.
Fewer studies show negligible or even positive impacts on non-Chinese labor mar-
kets. For instance, Feenstra and Sasahara (2017) and Feenstra et al. (2017) found
that the increased demand from China and cross-border service provision compensate
for losses experienced in goods traded on the domestic and export markets. Never-
theless, even if there were certain compensations in terms of quantity leading to the
same amount of employed labor, the change in the composition of goods and services
produced and traded by an economy can have nontrivial implications for the demanded
labor skills and income inequality. Consequently, next to the beneficial effects through
increased product variety and cheaper products for consumers, more efficient firms, and
decreasing global inequality between countries,1 it is relevant to study the consequences
of trade liberalization also for income inequality within countries, as these economic
changes can have drastic socio-political implications. For instance, Colantone and
Stanig (2018) showed that citizens of the United Kingdom (UK) regions, affected more
severely by the China shock, tended to vote more to leave the European Union (EU),
and at the same time, the percentage who voted to leave the EU was systematically
larger among people having lower wages (Bell and Machin, 2016).
1As shown, e.g., by Broda and Weinstein, 2006, Halpern et al., 2015, and Lakner and Milanovic,
2016, respectively.
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Europe-wide evidence on China’s trade expansion’s effect on income inequality is
lacking, whereas the country studies available yield mixed results. In Norway, the
expansion has decreased manufacturing employment’s share through pressure on both
the global and the local markets, as the study of Balsvik et al. (2015) demonstrates
using rich regional data. In France, according to the study of Basco et al. (2017) (based
on the idea of Autor et al., 2014, using employee-employer data), the effect was more
pronounced on the lower end of the income distribution, manifesting itself in more
churn–off and fewer hours worked. Trade pressure has also accelerated technological
change within and reallocation between firms, which have also had adverse labor market
effects (see Bloom et al., 2016, using firm-level data). However, according to the study
of Breemersch et al. (2017) on nineteen European Union (EU) countries using sectoral
data, while China does seem to have some effect on job polarization, the primary driver
behind it seems to be ongoing technological change, although this itself might have been
induced by the China shock (Bloom et al., 2016). In Germany, it is mostly a secular
trend that drives decreasing manufacturing employment, while globalization, and rising
trade with China in particular, did not seem to speed up the manufacturing decline
there, as Dauth et al. (2017) find using sectoral-regional aggregated administrative
data from Germany.
It is thus still a matter of active debate whether, in Europe, the labor market
losses or benefits of the expansion of China dominate, and this is particularly true
for inequality. The mere possibility of the China WTO accession’s impact on the
EU can be doubted based on the fact that, because of the preexisting bilateral trade
agreements between China and the EU before the end of 2001, there were few changes
in their bilateral trade conditions.2On the other hand the trade conditions between
2“7.The only obligation for WTO Members is that they must accord China so-called permanent
MFN (‘most favoured nation’) status, entitling it to be treated in the same way as every other
WTO Member, unless exceptions are specified in the protocol of accession. As the EU has always
accorded China this status in any event, there will be virtually no practical impact.” (see the Proposal
for a Council Decision establishing the Community position within the Ministerial Conference set
up by the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization on the accession of the People’s
Republic of China to the World Trade Organization in European Commission, 2002 (url: https:
//eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001PC0517:EN:HTML) or Snyder,
2009, p. 1069).
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China and the US have been substantially affected, thus inspiring numerous research
concentrating on it.
We point out that this fact does not eliminate the possibility of an impact on EU
markets for at least the following two reasons. First, the change of the conditions of
trade between China and third markets (i.e., outside the EU) affects the demand for
goods (and/or services) exported from the EU to those third markets. Second, if the
production of goods in China were connected with some fixed/sunk costs, the increase
in output, due to the global expansion of Chinese exports to the third countries, would
reduce the unit cost of production. Hence, it would lead to a competitive improvement
of Chinese goods in terms of lower prices, even in markets where there were no changes
of formal trade conditions in terms of tariff and/or non-tariff barriers.
Two further predictions stem from the discussed arguments about the relative im-
portance of and interconnections between the external pressure faced in export mar-
kets and the internal pressure experienced domestically by the EU countries due to
the increasing imports from China.3 First, the Chinese trade pressure faced directly
in external markets is likely to be more significant than in the domestic EU market,
because of larger changes of foreign trade conditions between China and third countries
in comparison to those between China and the EU. This may also result in a failure
to find a significant impact if only the domestic pressure were considered. Second, the
domestically experienced pressure is likely to be highly correlated with the external
pressure, as the former one stems from the scale effects of the increased total Chinese
production and exports. This would also suggest that, at least in the EU’s case, the
best strategy for identifying the pressure would be the extraction of a common com-
ponent from the two. Otherwise, high correlation between the domestic and external
pressures can lead to a multicollinearity-induced increase in variance of standard es-
timators, and thus, potentially, in the apparent ‘insignificance’ and/or incorrect signs
of some components. In our analysis, the discussed predictions will be corroborated by
3Besides the external pressure on third markets and the domestically faced pressure, we also sep-
arated the China market as a particular EU exports market, in order to see if it has some specific
importance, but it was insignificant in our sample.
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the data, whereas the previous EU studies did not take into account at least some of
these aspects.
The initial China WTO accession shock to trade is not guaranteed to translate into
further impacts, as it might be mitigated by various intermediate adjustments that
reduce the original pressure. Hence, next to the pressure indicator, we consider various
adjustment mechanisms. The first is import substitution, where imports from third
markets are just substituted by Chinese goods, thus crowding out those from the third
markets.4 The second is export facilitation, where the supposedly cheaper intermediate
products from China can facilitate EU production and exports. The third is export
reallocation, where former exports from the EU to the markets of third countries can be
replaced by EU exports to the fast-growing Chinese market if conditions there become
more beneficial than elsewhere.
Given that these simple market-switching adjustments were insufficient to alleviate
the pressure, further economic processes start taking place through various channels.
The first of these is connected with the inter-sectoral shifts due to the Heckscher-Ohlin
mechanism and factor price adjustments (see Leamer, 1995, Stolper and Samuelson,
1941, and, for a broader positioning and discussion, Helpman, 2017). The second is
related to the intra-sectoral shifts due to the switch to skill-intensive products and
vertical specialization, as in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Krugman (2008), and/or
to the globalization-induced higher demand for skilled labor whenever only the most
efficient firms export, as in Melitz (2003) and Harrigan and Reshef (2015). The first
concentrates on changes between sectors—in our case, a decrease in the share of manu-
facturing. The second emphasizes vertical specialization, the importance of intermedi-
ate goods, and the selection of firms within the exporting manufacturing sector. Both
result in forces that ultimately imply lower wages and potentially lost jobs for employ-
ees of firms that cannot or fail to adjust, but higher wages for higher qualifications
and new jobs for those with firms that can take advantage of the ensuing changes.
4See, e.g., Greenaway et al. (2008), Pham et al. (2016), and Baiardi and Carluccio (2019) for such
evidence in exports of goods of varying technological intensity.
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Dismissed workers that cannot be absorbed by more productive manufacturing firms
or other sectors thus would become unemployed.
Even the inter-sectoral labor shift from manufacturing to other sectors, which would
alleviate the increase in unemployment, is likely to raise income inequality for the
following two reasons. Workers dismissed from the manufacturing sector are more
likely to accept lower wages in this stressful situation with abnormal supply of labor
due to the increased number of layoffs and the increased direct competition between
them. In addition, there is also a simple composition effect, at least in the EU’s
case. As the right panel of Figure A13 reveals (see Appendix E.3), manufacturing and
industry in general are among the sectors in the EU that typically have low intra-
sectoral wage inequality.5 Hence, a random shift of labor from manufacturing to other
(nonindustrial) sectors is likely to augment income inequality by itself, although in a
less drastic and deterministic manner than a shift to unemployment. Consequently,
the wage rate differentiation, inter-sectoral shifts, and (un)employment effects have the
potential to increase income inequality, and the net of these is an empirical question.
In this paper, we study the effect of increasing trade pressure from China on regional
income inequality6 within the regions of the former EU15 countries7 (currently, EU14
and the UK) by constructing from different sources the comparable inequality and
trade pressure measures covering the period from 1996 to 2014. Besides the fact that
the number of observations with only fifteen cross-sections at the country level was
simply insufficient for our econometric analysis,8 the choice of the regional level is
motivated by the fact that the dominant part of the pressure from China hit the
manufacturing sector, whose employment share varies only modestly by countries but
5Similar findings are also presented in Martinez Turegano (2020) using a different income concept.
6The precise concept of (net household equivalized) income under consideration is defined in Section
2. As inequality metrics, we will use the log-variance of income, the Gini index, and the income
percentile ratios to measure income inequality. The main reported results rely on the log-variance
of income because its empirical models outperform those with the Gini index in terms of adequacy,
especially whenever a smaller number of instruments is employed.
7The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
8We employ dynamic panel models estimated with the generalized method of moments, which
relies on the asymptotics of the increasing number of cross-sections. A large number of cross-sections
is therefore essential for our empirical application.
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quite substantially by regions.9 This variability, together with a much larger number
of observations available at the regional level, increase the power of inference. At the
same time, the level of (dis)aggregation needs to remain large enough that inequality
metrics can be meaningfully applied and be sufficiently represented by the survey data
(see the discussion in Section 2.1). Therefore, we do not go beyond the NUTS110 level
of the EU’s territorial disaggregation11.
Our investigation was motivated by the following stylized facts characterized in
Appendix A. First, not only did major European exporting countries’ shares of the total
world exports fall along with that of the US after China’s entry to the WTO in 2001
(see the left Figure A1 in Appendix A), but also the growth rate of exports decelerated
substantially in most of the former EU15 countries (see Figure A3 in Appendix A). At
the same time, inequality has increased in more than two-thirds of the regions over the
same years, as indicated on the right panel of Figure A1. Whether this relationship is
causal is not self-evident, but inequality tended to decrease in most EU regions before
China’s entrance to the WTO (see Figure A12 in Appendix E.2). At the same time,
China’s relative performance in terms of exports has drastically improved in practically
all (not only EU) markets and relative to the exports of practically any other country
(see Figure A2 in Appendix A).
Our analysis of the initial pressure is closest to the regional approach of Balsvik
et al. (2015) but also accounts for various intermediate adjustments and uses a dy-
namic panel estimation method with additionally constructed regional trade pressure
instruments, discussed in Section 2. We consider the trade pressure from China faced
by EU producers in various markets, separating the external exports markets, such
as in Autor et al. (2013) and Balsvik et al. (2015), the domestic market, such as in
Acemoglu et al. (2016), and also the potential gains from entering the Chinese market
(as in Autor et al., 2013, or Balsvik et al., 2015). Given the previously highlighted
9As our preliminary analysis shows, in the former EU15 regions to be considered, the labor share
of 25 to 60-year-old workers working in manufacturing ranges from 3% to 34% at the NUTS1 level.
10Here, NUTS abbreviates the Nomenclature of Territorial Unites of Statistics.
11Most of the regions are at the NUTS1 level with only a few exceptions – see the next section and
Appendix E.2 for details.
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importance of the external pressure, we start the presentation of findings from it while
gradually introducing various other markets and adjustment effects afterwards.
The structure of the paper follows the line of thought outlined above. We delegate
much of the technical detail to the Appendices. Appendix A presents the motivating
plots discussed in the Introduction. Appendix B reports the estimations of robust-
ness analysis, including the results when varying the composition and number of in-
struments, with different definitions of pressure indicators, as well as controlling for
the previous enlargement of the EU with countries from Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE), migration, technological change, share of service exports, etc. Appendix C
discusses a couple of econometric issues. It includes the state-space representation
used to derive the country-specific dynamic common factors from the joint process of
external and domestic Chinese trade pressure indicators together with its empirical
characterization. It also presents the semi-reduced representation of the impact chan-
nels together with the calculation of their relative importance, and an evaluation of
some alternative econometric approaches to the measurement of the impact. Finally,
Appendix D presents a stylized calculation of the implied inequality increase based on
the simplest reduced-form specification of the impact measurement. Appendix E de-
scribes the trade, inequality, and employment data used in the paper. It also presents
the stylized facts and respective plots revealing the basic relations between inequality
and various explanatory variables.
2 Data and the econometric approach
2.1 Data
Our analysis rests on an unbalanced panel of 61–65 regions12 covering the former EU15
countries (currently, EU14 and the UK) for the period between 1994 and 2014, created
from multiple data sources (we discuss a few exceptions in Appendix E.2). The dataset
brings together our impulse, outcome and intermediary variables, that is, measures of
12Varying by different years due to the data (un)availability.
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trade, inequality and employment structure, as well as other factors. A brief description
of the dataset follows shortly, with further details provided in Appendix A.
Our data of the trade drivers rely on the outcome of the joint OECD–WTO Trade
in Value Added (TiVA) initiative13. Although qualitatively similar results were also
obtained using the OECD Structural Analysis Statistics (STAN) database and, in par-
ticular, employing the STAN bilateral trade database by industry and end-use category,
the TiVA approach has a clear advantage in our case. For certain trade pressure in-
dicators to be defined succinctly, we need a direct comparability of exports, imports,
production, and/or value added. This is granted in the TiVA database, where various
issues of different pricing, data sources, etc. are already resolved in a unified framework,
whereas they would be faced using primary data.
TiVA resulted in a database which includes, among others, bilateral trade statistics
based on flows of value added embodied in final domestic demand, which is harmonized
relying on the inter-country input–output tables. The employed 2016 edition of the
TiVA database covers data from 1995 until 2011 and contains indicators for various
economies, including those from the OECD, EU28 and G20, most East and South-
east Asian economies and a selection of South American countries. The database also
specifies indicators for various industrial sectors. Since we are interested mostly in
manufacturing activities, we used multiple indicators (exports, imports, output, value
added, etc.) with the Total Manufactures identifier (C15T37) from this database. We
later aggregated these indicators to obtain exports from a given country to a given
market and to create various trade pressure measures. These synthetic indicators
became our key variables to measure the impulse of expanding Chinese trade activity.
We created our regional inequality database from first principles, as no ready-made
dataset included the inequality measures we needed. To be able to span the mid-1990s
to mid-2010s period, which was necessary to account for the pre- and post-Chinese
accession periods, we used two sets of microdata as a basis: the European Community
13We use the 2016 version of it, which covers the largest span of the relevant period, whereas the
2018 version of the database initiates only in 2005.
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Household Panel (ECHP) for the 1990s and the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for the 2000s. Regional identifiers were missing for
many years in the cases of Germany and the United Kingdom, so we also used their
local household surveys, the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
Year by year, we calculated our statistics using regional cross-sections of data and
appended these to form a panel. We have chosen NUTS1 as the default regional unit,
although we are forced to use country-level data in the case of the Netherlands, Portugal
and Finland – see details in Section E.2 in Appendix A. From now on, we refer to these
as ‘regions’. Our choice of a regional unit is a pragmatic one, but it is also in line
with the opinion of Boldrin and Canova (2001), which we share: for a region to be a
meaningful unit of analysis, it ‘has to be large enough to “convexify” undeniable human
indivisibilities and micro fixed costs’ – NUTS1 regions are just such entities. They are,
on the other hand, sufficiently smaller than countries to make visible within-country
heterogeneity regarding manufacturing and thus exposure to trade shocks.
Our data refer to individuals, and our target population is 25 to 60-years-olds to
separate (otherwise important) peculiarities regarding the beginning and the end of
a labor market career. We have used net household equivalized income, corrected
for between-country price differences, as our income concept. It absorbs the most
shocks among all income types (see Benczu´r et al., 2017 for recent EU-wide evidence)
and includes components related to a wide array of events,14 thus capturing a more
complete, final effect. We have calculated the variance of the natural logarithm (log-
variance) of income as our primary outcome along with the Gini index and the 90/50
and 50/10 income percentile ratios.
Although we think that general household surveys are fit for supporting regional
analysis of income inequality15, their sample size does not allow us to study the addi-
14These include changes in the level of wages, hours worked, employment status, the amount of
taxes paid and transfers received by all household members, many of which are an adjustment margin
for the individual.
15See our discussion of ‘representativity’ in Appendix E.2.
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tional sectoral decomposition of employment at the regional level. Therefore, we have
also used the EU Labour Force Survey, which has larger survey samples, to calculate
complementary statistics related to the labor market, in particular, the split of labor by
industries and its various qualifications. We have worked similarly as with inequality-
related data: we used individual data on the 25 to 60-year-old population to calculate
several indicators of unemployment, employment and employment share of different
subgroups of the employed. We shall also use one of these indices, the region’s share of
total national manufacturing employment, for the construction of our trade pressure
indicators.
Ultimately, we obtain an unbalanced panel of 65 regions for the years 1994–2014,
yielding an overall 1,348 observations on inequality. The statistics calculated rely on
cells containing an average of 2,000 observations, 91 being the first percentile, 51 the
minimum, 12,364 the 99th percentile and 15,018 the maximum number.16
Even though our database on inequality ends later than the one on trade statistics
(in 2014 and 2011, respectively), these additional years on inequality turn out to be
useful. As revealed in Section 6, the impact of trade pressure on income inequality can
lag by up to three years.
2.2 Econometric specification and estimation
Although stylized facts based on the raw figures presented in Appendix A already sug-
gest a positive relationship between the Chinese trade pressure and inequality, there
might be critical confounding processes and potential endogeneity at work, and con-
trolling for them is essential to increase our confidence in the existence and strength of
the effect. This subsection thus presents the econometric specifications under estima-
tion together with various controls, whereas the next subsection discusses instrumental
variables used to identify the Chinese trade pressure effect.
16At the country level, we have from about 3,500 (Belgium, Luxembourg) to 10,000 (Italy, Ger-
many) observations, with an average of 5,500 per country before 2000, and 5,000 (Austria, Ireland,
Luxembourg) to 24,000 observations (Italy), with an average of 10,000 per country, after 2000. Note
that sample sizes are not proportional to population, e.g., the samples for the United Kingdom range
from 5,500 to 10,000, while those for Luxembourg rane from 3,300 to 8,000.
11
Concerning the basic functional form of the estimating equation, we followed re-
gional analyses such as Autor et al. (2013) and Balsvik et al. (2015) and rely mostly
on simple (log-)linear specifications. In order to start discussing the estimation of the
trade pressure from China, we express inequality in a region r in year t in the following
general dynamic panel form:
α(L)Ir,t = f (Pr,t,Zr,t) + ξr,t, (1)
where:
α(L) = 1+α1L+ · · ·+αkLk stands for a lag polynomial with k ∈ N chosen based
on the significance of lags;
Ir,t is a measure of regional inequality;
f denotes a generic linear function that can also include lags, various transforma-
tions and interactions of its arguments while, potentially, dropping some of them,
too;
Pr,t is a vector of trade pressure indicators including the external pressure in-
dicator P(X)r,t , to be defined in eq. (5); the domestic pressure indicator P(M)r,t , to
be defined in eq. (6); and their dynamic common factor P(F )r,t , to be discussed
shortly;
Zr,t is a vector of additional variables, controlling for intermediate adjustments
next to the initial pressure, accounting for economic channels of the impact, as
well as controlling for various other region- and time-specific effects; and
ξr,t is a zero mean error term satisfying the usual regularity conditions, but not
necessarily uncorrelated with the pressure indicators in Pr,t (or even with some
components of Zr,t).
The log-variance of net household equivalized income will be the base measure of
inequality. Since its distribution is skewed, we take its natural logarithm, using it as
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Ir,t, which also reduces the heteroskedasticity of errors in eq. (1). We will also consider
(logarithms of) the Gini index and the 90/50 and 50/10 income percentile ratios as the
dependent variables. This is not only an additional robustness check, but also a study
of whether the lower and upper parts of income distributions were affected similarly.
In eq. (1), we use a generic linear function f instead of a fixed structure to allow
for a flexible linear representation with many potential combinations of pressure, ex-
planatory and control variables, some derivative indicators, as well as their lags. The
most important cases are connected with the following alternative structures. First, we
allow for different combinations of pressure indicators, including their common factor
used as a single joint pressure indicator. For each region, it is derived from the state-
space representation characterized in Appendix C.1. Second, we separate between the
reduced and semi-reduced representations of the impact.
The reduced-form analysis aims at projecting (through instruments) inequality dir-
ectly onto the pressure indicators (some or all components of Pr,t). In the basic form,
it includes only the pressure indicator with individual and/or period effects,17 but it
can be extended to contain some additional controls accounting, among others, for
general macroeconomic conditions such as the state of the business cycle and/or inter-
national competitiveness, some intermediate adjustments through trade reallocation
between different markets, as well as other variables capturing economic structure,
technological change, previous EU enlargements, intensity of migration, etc.
The semi-reduced representation aims instead at projecting (through the same set
of instruments) inequality not directly onto the pressure indicators, but onto variables
that could represent the economic channels of the impact. We aim at the structural
characteristics, avoiding nominal variables, and use the regional unemployment rate,
17It should be noted that individual effects are always included and compensate for the time-
invariant regional characteristics influencing inequality, but which are difficult or impossible to
quantify. The period effects were included only in the minimal specifications containing the trade
pressure indicator alone. As the number of period effects is noticeable (nearly twenty), their presence
substantially reduces the degrees of freedom and weakens the power of statistical inference. This was
not problematic in the simplest specification with the pressure indicator alone (as will be presented in
Table A2 in Appendix B), but became an issue whenever many other control variables were present
in the specifications. Similar concerns prevented Breemersch et al. (2017) from considering the period
effects or trends altogether.
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the regional labor share of those employed in manufacturing (out of all employed in a
region), the share of high- and medium-high-tech goods in manufacturing exports, as
well as the share of white collar workers and workers with higher education in manu-
facturing relative to analogous shares in all sectors in a region.18 The unemployment
rate and the manufacturing share measure the out-of-employment and inter-sectoral
shift effects, whereas the last three indicators aim at capturing the pressure on in-
equality stemming from the changes within the manufacturing sector (intra-sectoral
adjustments). We do not claim that this list of variables is exhaustive, but it is inform-
ative about the importance of economic processes discussed in the Introduction, and
we will show that it is admissible: the pressure indicators are insignificant if added to
such specification. This semi-reduced equation of channels, together with the corres-
ponding separate equations determining the reaction of each of these variables to the
initial pressure, will allow us to evaluate their importance in contributing to the total
impact. A formal econometric characterization of the semi-reduced representation with
its usage to derive the relative importance of the channels is explicated in Appendix
C.2.
Our estimation method seeks to improve upon previous ones that mostly used a vari-
ant of a multi-year difference estimator of (stacked) cross-sections (see Appendix C.3
for a discussion of this approach with its empirical application to our case). Our
own approach involves estimating a dynamic panel regression model.19 As the the-
oretical discussion of Bellon (2015) shows, the impact of trade liberalisation over a
shorter period might differ substantially from the longer impact because inequality can
overshoot its steady-state level. It therefore becomes essential to allow for dynamic
adjustments.
We estimate the model using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.
As a base, we follow the two-step estimation strategy in first differences20 of Arellano
18The normalization with respect to all sectors intends to remove the potential general trends in
an economy, e.g., because of the supply-side-induced changes connected with some general trends in
education.
19We use the pgmm() function from the plm package for R (see Croissant and Millo, 2008).
20The usage of purely first-differences-based estimates instead of the system GMM in our case has
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and Bond (1991), with second and third lags of the first differences of the dependent
variable acting as the GMM instruments. The two-step approach relies on the es-
timator of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix proposed in Windmeijer (2005),
which both includes a small sample correction that benefits the second-stage estimates,
e.g., by making the standard errors more precise, and is robust to arbitrary heteroske-
dasticity. Note that the two-step estimator is natural in our case, because the regional
data we use have a known element of heteroskedasticity; we calculated them from in-
dividual data aggregating up to the regional level from different sample sizes, which
leads to a varying precision of the estimates in different regions. Even though most
of the results in the literature come from regressions weighted simply by the regional
sample sizes underlying the aggregate data, we follow the advice of Dickens (1990) not
to weight blindly, but to study the heteroskedasticity structure. Our results show that
the assumption of heteroskedasticity driven only by the size of a region does not hold,
with its contribution to the realized actual heteroskedasticity being relatively small.
Thus, weighting only with the sample size would in fact be inefficient. Since we use a
robust variance-covariance estimator along with two-step GMM, we do not apply such
pre-weight.21
Aside from a few marginal cases, the estimated specifications seem to be suffi-
ciently adequate at standard significance levels from the econometric point of view.
First, the instruments’ admissibility in terms of over-identifying restrictions based on
orthogonality conditions (Sargan, 1958 and Hansen, 1982) is not rejected practically
for all specifications of main interest. Second, the hypothesis of the absence of serial
correlation of errors (Arellano and Bond, 1991) at higher lag orders than the first one
was also not rejected, as required in the GMM estimation of dynamic panels with first
differences. In addition to these statistics, both the number of cross-sections (regions)
a specific advantage: as compared to the levels, the changes are less likely to be affected by the fact
that we are using two different surveys to construct the panel of income inequality. Furthermore,
the system GMM would substantially increase the number of instruments, creating pressure on the
admissible number of instruments.
21Although using the estimated weights for heteroskedasticity pre-correction, obtained from a re-
gression of squares of residuals on survey sample sizes and including an intercept, in the two-step
GMM produced similar estimates to those obtained without such pre-weighting.
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and the number of instruments will be reported in the tables, together with the total
number of observations. In the baseline estimations, we set the number of instruments
to about 70% of the number of cross-sections in order to comply with the rule of thumb
(see, e.g., Roodman, 2009a,b) that the number of instruments should not exceed the
number of cross-sections. In the robustness analysis in Section 6, it will be further
reduced to about 33% and to below 10% of the number of cross-sections. Standard
errors of estimated coefficients will be reported below each coefficient in the brackets.
Our main interest in eq. (1) lies in the sign, size, and empirical significance of the
pressure indicators. To identify the impact of China’s WTO accession, reducing also
the potential endogeneity problem, we furthermore use regular instruments besides
the previously discussed GMM instruments, as presented next. The instrumental ap-
proach is further necessary to get consistent parameter estimates under the presence of
explanatory variables observed with errors; in our case, this is the estimated dynamic
common factor.
2.3 Regular instruments
The GMM instruments defined previously are used to instrument for the lagged de-
pendent variable in the dynamic panel. To deal with potential endogeneity issues of
other determinants, we further used conventional instruments besides the GMM ones.
Although Balsvik et al. (2015) argues that pressure on the exports market is exogenous
in the current setting of Chinese trade expansion, it is not guaranteed that inequality
does not reflect, e.g., certain structural patterns of an economy that simultaneously
determine both the level of inequality and the adjustment to the trade pressure at
the same time, thus inducing endogeneity between the two. In addition, the usage of
instruments can also be helpful in reducing the bias due to omitted variables, provided
that they and the instruments are orthogonal. There are many mechanisms driving
inequality, such as autonomous changes in demand for final goods or labor; changes in
the population structure in terms of age, sex, education; etc. However, they are less
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likely to be correlated with the instruments that will be characterized shortly. There-
fore, the instrumental variable (IV) strategy is already likely to reduce the potential
acuteness of such misspecification. Nevertheless, in the robustness analysis in Section
6, we will also control for a number of additional factors.
Following the general idea of Acemoglu et al. (2016), we construct the regular
instruments using China’s trade with other countries. The following three types of
instruments will be employed in the main estimations, exploring further the results’
sensitivity to their variation in Section 6.
The first group of instruments of the Chinese trade pressure compares China’s ex-
ports performance to exports from countries that are geographically close to China and,
at the same time, are the EU’s three largest Asian trade partners besides China. It
comprises the (logarithms of) ratios of China-to-India, China-to-Japan, and China-to-
Korea exports, separating their total exports (WORLD) from their exports to countries
belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The total exports are best suited to capture total scale effects, while the OECD mar-
ket, covering the most developed economies, could additionally allow for the potential
specificity of trade with such countries, e.g., in terms of types and structure of products.
We use this simple split of markets, as refinement to finer groups (ASEAN, NAFTA,
etc.) or even individual countries did not yield a sizable gain while creating pressure
on the admissible number of instruments. The considered Asian exporters have faced
the same changes (if any) in trade and shipping conditions from Asia to the rest of the
world as China, which makes them a natural reference group.22. These instruments
thus correlate with the Chinese expansion of exports and, consequently, the external
pressure, but not with the economic structure and inequality of the EU countries and
their regions which we are interested in.
The just-discussed instruments of the first group capture general trends but are
neither EU country-specific nor region-specific. By assuming that geographic similarity
22The results using China-to-US indicators were also explored (see Section 6 and Table A2 in
Appendix B)
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between countries/regions is to some extent informative about the similarity of pres-
sure, we design the second and third groups of instruments to be specific to a particular
region even though trade statistics are registered only at the country level. To achieve
this, we exploit the varying distances of regions to their neighboring countries, as iden-
tified by distance between the two nearest regions of different countries. The main
results reported hereafter will be based on the geodesic distances, but switching to the
distances by road or distances that take further economic factors into account did not
change the qualitative picture (all these distances are taken from Persyn et al., 2019).
The reciprocals of distances, normalized to add up to one,23 are used as region-specific
weights to aggregate the simple relative Chinese trade pressure indicators observed in
other EU15 countries (currently, EU14 and the UK).
The distance-based weighting is the same in the second and third groups of in-
struments, but the trade pressure indicators differ. The second group of instruments
weights Chinese exports relative to the exports of each country from the (former) EU15
countries and thus aims at capturing the pressure in external markets. Meanwhile, the
third group of instruments is obtained by weighting the ratios of imports to each of
the (former) EU15 countries from China and India, China and Japan, and China and
Korea. It thus evaluates whether imports to EU countries from China have increased
relative to imports from the other Asian exporters that are the EU’s three largest Asian
trading partners besides China. In all cases, the logarithms of the defined quantities
are employed to remove the dependence on scale differences and to reduce heteroske-
dasticity.
Formally, for each region indexed by r and period by t, the values of the three
23Note that the country of an analyzed region is forced here to have a zero weight, i.e., it is omitted
by construction.
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groups of instruments are defined as follows24:
W
(1)
·,t (k,m) = log
X
(m)
CN,t
X
(m)
k,t
, k ∈ {IND, JPN, KOR}, m ∈ {OECD, WORLD}, (2)
W
(2)
r,t (m) = log
(∑N
j=1, j 6=i∗(r) wj,r
X
(m)
CN,t
X
(m)
j,t
)
, m ∈ {OECD, WORLD}, (3)
W
(3)
r,t (k) = log
(∑N
j=1, j 6=i∗(r) wj,r
M
(j)
CN,t
M
(j)
k,t
)
, k ∈ {IND, JPN, KOR}, (4)
where:
N(= 15) denotes the total number of countries from the former EU15;
i∗ := i∗(r) is a country index identified by a region index r, i.e., all region indices
of a particular country are mapped to that index i∗ of the country;
wj,r =
λj,r∑N
i=1,i 6=i∗(r) λi,r
, λi,r =
1
D(i,r)
, i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} are weights with D(i, r)
standing for the distance between a region indexed by r (from i∗(r) country) and
the closest region from a foreign country indexed by i;
X
(m)
CN,t and X
(m)
k,t are exports to the OECD countries or WORLD (as indexed
by m) from China and either India, Japan, or South Korea (as indexed by k),
correspondingly;
X
(m)
CN,t and X
(m)
j,t are exports to the OECD countries or WORLD from China and
from a former EU15 country indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 15}, correspondingly; and
M
(j)
CN,t and M
(j)
k,t are imports of the former EU15 country indexed by j from China
and either India (IND), Japan (JPN), or South Korea (KOR), respectively.
In the baseline estimations, all three groups of instruments will be employed,
whereas their partial use is also explored in Section 6 while studying the reduction
24It should be pointed out that we also considered further splitting of instruments, e.g., using a finer
disaggregation of imports by countries in the second group of instruments, or further disaggregation of
exports into additional sub-markets in the first and third groups of instruments. However, the results
remained similar while creating pressure on the admissible upper limit of instruments (see the related
discussion in Section 6 on the sensitivity of estimates to the number of instruments).
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of the total number of instruments and the projections using a single type of instru-
ments. As we will also show in Section 6, the pressure impact can lag significantly up
to three periods; therefore, we allow up to three lags of the defined instruments too.
3 Inequality effects of the pressure in export mar-
kets
At the core of analyses looking at the effect of China’s trade expansion on foreign labor
markets is a pressure indicator. It is this indicator that summarizes and identifies the
impact of trade expansion. In a regression framework, the parameter attached to this
variable is the researchers’ ultimate interest. In this section, we concentrate on its sign
and significance, whereas Appendix D provides a stylized evaluation of its economic
size by isolating the effect of China’s trade pressure within the observed increase in
regional inequality.
Trade pressure indicators have been in use since the seminal paper of Autor et al.
(2013) in various forms. They usually sum the effect of growing Chinese exports on
different markets, weighted by the importance of these markets. This importance is
usually approximated by the share of the given market in the total trading activity
of a sector within a region. The indicators increase with Chinese trade activity and
decrease with the country’s or region’s output or exports. The markets considered can
be external (i.e., exports markets), such as in Autor et al. (2013) and Balsvik et al.
(2015), or domestic, such as in Acemoglu et al. (2016). The indicator can incorporate
both the gains in the Chinese market and the potential losses in others, such as Autor
et al. (2013), or look only at the latter, such as Balsvik et al. (2015). It can rely on the
level of Chinese exports, as did Autor et al. (2013), or their value relative to the given
country’s own exports, as in Acemoglu et al. (2016). Finally, trade data are usually
available at the national level and are projected to the regional level proportionally to
employment, as in Autor et al. (2013). See Topalova (2010) and Kovak (2013) for an
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explanation of this practice in the general case of trade liberalization. In rare cases,
such as in Balsvik et al. (2015), genuinely regional data are available, requiring no
projection at all.
Besides the external (exports) and domestic (country’s own) markets, where much
of the literature has found negative effects, we will also distinguish the Chinese market,
which could be expected to compensate for the pressure faced elsewhere. We do so using
separate indicators in each case, starting, in this section, from the external pressure
faced in export markets. We initiate from here for several reasons. First, as was
highlighted in the Introduction, it is expected a priori to be the most important pressure
component in the EU’s case, and it will indeed turn out empirically to be the most
relevant one. Second, even though we apply consistent parameter estimators, one
can still doubt if results based on specifications that include the estimated dynamic
common factors are sufficiently precise in our finite sample situation, thus preferring a
more directly observed series. Third, it has a very clear break after 2001 (to be revealed
in Figure 3.1, which will be discussed shortly), which will be utilized to get a stylized
prediction of the economic significance of the impact of China’s accession on income
inequality in Appendix D. Finally, it will allow us to highlight a number of important
aspects in a simpler manner that will also be relevant for other indicators to be used
later on.
Consequently, starting from a specification with a single (and the most important)
determinant, we intend to show in this section that even the simplest specification
points to the presence of a significant impact.
3.1 A viable pressure indicator for European regions
To develop our pressure indicator, we consider the best practice of the literature and
constraints imposed by the data at hand. Because of its crucial role in Chinese trade
expansion, we concentrate on the manufacturing sector. As our trade data are at the
country level, we shall project them to the region level proportionally to the region’s
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share in national manufacturing employment.25 Thus we define our measure of the
external pressure in exports markets as follows26:
P(X)r,t = log
P (XC)i,t Ri,r,t︸︷︷︸
projection
 , P (XC)i,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
country−pressure
=
∑
g
si,g,t0
XCN,g,t
Xi,g,t
, (5)
where:
Ri,r,t denotes region r’s share of total manufacturing employment in country i,
year t;
si,g,t0 stands for the share of exports to market g out of total exports by country
i in the pre-accession year t0;
XCN,g,t represents exports from China to market g in year t, excluding country i
if it belonged to region g;
Xi,g,t are exports from country i to market g in year t.
The indicator defined in equation (5) thus has two parts. The country-level external
pressure (P
(XC)
i,t ) relates manufacturing exports from China to market g and exports
from an EU15 country indexed by i to the same destination market, the resulting ratios
being finally summed across all markets27. The index increases with the total value of
China’s exports and increases even more if such growth happens in a market that was
important in the pre-accession year. Using China’s exports in relative (rather than
absolute) terms, we can take into account the changing export activity in a market:
decreasing activity in country i will make the relative pressure larger, ceteris paribus.
The usage of relative exports here has several advantages. First, levels cannot be
25We prefer the region’s share of national manufacturing as a projection variable because we did
not detect any statistically significant influence on it from Chinese trade expansion, i.e., on the dis-
tribution of national manufacturing employment among regions–not to be confused with the share of
manufacturing employment out of total employment in a region.
26Note that a region index r uniquely defines the respective EU15 country indexed by i; hence,
we omit the country index i from the regional-level pressure indicator to simplify the notation of the
variable on the left side of eq. (5).
27The splitting of markets is defined taking into account the intensity of trade with the EU as well
as the geographic or socioeconomic proximity of countries (see Section E.1).
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fully informative about the pressure as, hypothetically, domestic exports could have
been growing much faster than the Chinese exports, for instance, because the cheaper
Chinese intermediate products might have been making domestic exports of final goods
even more competitive in global markets. Second, the usage of ratios avoids the need to
choose the denomination currency, which otherwise could have an effect on econometric
estimations, although proper controlling and/or instrumenting might soften this aspect.
Third, the ratio of nominal exports can be thought of as a stylized index representing
the ratio of preference parameters in a hypothetical Cobb-Douglas utility function of
goods from different markets,28, which can be linked to the marketing literature on
the importance of country of origin (see, e.g., Agrawal and Kamakura, 1999, Bloemer
et al., 2009, and Magnusson and Westjohn, 2011, for overviews).
The left panel of Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of country-level pressure in exports
market P
(XC)
i,t scaled with values at the base year 2000 for each country for visual
comparability. The average trend line has a clear structural break after 2001.29
To obtain region-specific external pressure in the export markets, we use a projec-
tion term Ri,r,t defined region r’s share of total manufacturing employment in country i
in year t.30 Regional variation thus comes from the projection term, distributing 100%
of the country-level pressure to the regions within a country31 (in Section 6, we will
also explore the sensitivity of results to fixing Ri,r,t = Ri,r,t0 for t > t0 = 2000). These
28For a stylized motivation, suppose that the utility function at a moment t ∈ Z is given by
U(t) = AQ
α(t)
CN,tQ
β1(t)
1,t , . . . , Q
βn(t)
n,t , where Qj,t represents the quantity of products used from different
markets j ∈ {CN, 1, 2, . . . , n}, n ∈ N, and the index CN identifies the Chinese origin of goods. Then,
the ratio of nominal terms
PCN,tQCN,t
Pj,tQj,t
= α(t)βj(t) can be informative about the development of preferences
in terms of the origin of goods. In our case, we compare exports from various countries to a particular
geographic entity (its imports from those countries), thus getting an insight about the developments
in such hypothetical preferences. It is clear that this is a highly stylized motivation, as, besides the
roughness of the aggregation level and ignorance of many other determinants, goods might be used
not only by consumers, since there are intermediate products as well as re-exports. Nevertheless, it
gives some intuition of what is behind the potential meaning of the employed ratios.
29As is shown in Figure A7 in Appendix D, the same break is also evident in the logarithmically
transformed demeaned data of the country pressure without using any year-specific normalization.
30One should take note that this is the distribution of manufacturing labor among the regions and
not the distribution of total labor in a region among sectors.
31We have also considered using the regional composition of manufacturing by its sub-industries
as well using pressure indicators differentiated by exports linked to specific types of these particular
industries, thus lending further variation to across-region pressure. This extension, however, was not
viable due to the resulting massive number of missing observations at the detailed regional-sectoral
level.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the country-level pressure in export market (left panel) and
histogram of the regional projection term (right panel)
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data change only slowly over time32 and have a skewed distribution – see the right
panel of Figure 3.1. Shares are typically below 50% – the only higher value belongs to
Flanders (BE2), and values at 100% belong to countries aggregated to or defined as a
single NUTS1 unit.
As a final step, we take the (natural) logarithm of the product of the country-level
pressure and the projection term in equation (5) to account for the skewed distribution
of the projection term33 and to reduce the heteroskedasticity over time, which would
otherwise translate to errors in the equations under estimation.
32Regional labor share of total employment in manufacturing in a country is driven by factors
other than the Chinese pressure indicators, which were insignificant in explaining them in a panel
framework.
33We have also explored other alternatives, including the projection of the logarithm of the country
pressure using regional labor share, i.e., log(P
(XC)
i,t ) ·Ri,r,t, but it had much worse adequacy in terms
of the Hansen-Sargan test in the econometric estimations.
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3.2 Base estimates and their sensitivity
Based on our motivating stylized facts and available evidence, we want to estimate the
effect of the trade pressure in exports markets defined in eq. (5) on inequality. Table 1
contains the results of the basic estimations34, where the dependent variable is the
logarithm of log-variance (LVAR) of income and only the external pressure indicator is
under consideration. The results with other inequality metrics will follow shortly, and
other pressure indicators will be considered in Section 4, whereas various robustness
checks will be explicated in Section 6.
We find a significant first-order lag of the dependent variable across all specifica-
tions, which indicates quite substantial persistence in regional inequality that is some-
what larger in Column (1), when the pressure indicator with other factors is absent,
and thus the conditioning here is only on the fixed effects.
Next, we first of all evaluate whether the significance of the impact erroneously
stems only from the usage of the regional projection. Columns (2) and (3) thus
present the results both with only the (logarithm of) country-level external pressure
P(XC)i,t := log(P (XC)i,t ) without any regional projection (Ri,r,t), and with the region-
specific external pressure P(X)r,t (the term on the left in eq. (5)), correspondingly. Given
that the pressure indicator is significant in Column (2) already at the country level, it
is clear that the significance, obtained in the remaining columns with the regional-level
indicator included, does not stem from the employed projection alone.35 Nevertheless,
the usage of regional-level pressure will become beneficial in further cases containing
many explanatory variables.
China’s accession to the WTO took place about the same time when the euro was
introduced: the euro was adopted on January 1, 1999, with coins and notes introduced
into circulation in 2002 in twelve Euro Area countries. Although the euro was depre-
ciating until 2001, later the trend reverted until 2008. Decreasing competitiveness due
to the appreciation of the domestic currency could be an alternative explanation of the
34The tables were created using the stargazer package for R (see Hlavac, 2018).
35We should also point out that, in an analogous dynamic panel framework, there was no significant
impact of the pressure indicator on the regional share of manufacturing labor itself.
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decreasing performance of European producers and exports. Therefore, in Columns
(4) and (6), we extend the basic specification with the (logarithm of) real effective
exchange rates (REER) of the former EU15 countries.
Another important aspect is that economic activity was accelerating during the
2001–2007 period in most of the former EU15 countries, which has certain implications
for inequality (see, e.g., Barlevy and Tsiddon, 2006, and Sherman and Sherman, 2015).
Allowing for such possibility, we use the (logarithm of the) Economic Sentiment Index
(ESI) to proxy the country-specific state of a business cycle (see Columns (5) and (6)
in Table 1).
However, both these variables turned out to be insignificant, barely changing the
coefficient of the external pressure indicator. Given the instrumental nature of our
estimation, this result is not unexpected. On the contrary, the parameter estimate of
the external pressure P(X)r,t is highly significant in all specifications, indicating that a
10% increase in regional trade pressure (as given inside the brackets of equation (5))
yields about a 0.5% increase in the log-variance of income immediately (in the same
year) and about a 1% increase in the long run.
An additional concern might be that these findings could be driven by the financial
crisis and not the Chinese trade expansion.36 To evaluate this concern, we present
the results estimated with data only up to 2007 in Column (7) and, in Column (8),
allowing for a structural break in 2008 using a dummy variable taking a value of one
since 2008 and zero before that, i.e., introducing an indicator function 1{t ≥ 2008}.
We can convincingly see that the established effect of the external trade pressure is
not driven only by the financial crisis. If anything, there is an interaction between the
China pressure and the financial crisis, i.e., the financial crisis seems to augment the
impact of Chinese trade pressure on inequality. First, this might be explained by the
fact that the initial Chinese trade pressure shock resulted in a number of firms that
were still active, but barely surviving. The second shock, connected with the financial
36Although, at the EU level, the financial crisis resulted in convergence of income and income
inequality across the EU countries (see Cabral and Castellanos-Sosa, 2019, and Kvedaras and Cseres-
Gergely, 2020), the situation within countries and their regions might differ.
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crisis, reinforced the pressure, raising it above a certain critical level, thus forcing the
exit of such marginally functioning firms from the market. Second, during the upswing
of economic activity before the crisis, workers who lost their jobs because of Chinese
pressure could have been absorbed by other booming sectors, whereas they were likely
to be among the first to be dismissed when the business cycle turned around after the
financial crisis erupted.
3.3 Estimates with other inequality measures
The estimates so far have used the log-variance of income as the dependent variable,
but there are other income inequality measures to consider. The Gini index is a popular
aggregate metric of inequality that puts more weight on the middle of the distribution.
In the current setup, it can be understood as a robustness check. Percentile ratios, on
the other hand, can characterize different parts of the income distribution. We separate
the lower and upper parts of the income distribution by considering the 50/10 and
90/50 income percentile ratios. Looking at the former is essential, as most employees
in manufacturing are likely to be in the lower part of the income distribution.
Table 2 presents the results using alternative inequality measures as the outcome
variable. LVAR stands for the already known results using the (logarithm of the) log-
variance, and GINI represents the logarithm of the Gini index of inequality, while P5010
and P9050 denote the logarithms of the 50/10 and 90/50 income percentile ratios,
respectively.37 The left part of the results in Columns (1)–(4) is analogous to the one
in Column (6) in Table 1, but with a varying dependent variable.38 It is furthermore
expanded in Columns (5)–(8) with additional specifications where insignificant control
variables of macroeconomic conditions have been removed. Their comparison with
Columns (1)–(4) reveals that, practically, there is no change in the coefficient of the
pressure indicator. Hence, up until the robustness analysis, we will drop these control
37Similar results also hold with variables without the logarithmic transformation, but we prefer the
transformed ones, because the distributions of the initial variables were positively skewed.
38We use Column (6) of Table 1 as a baseline because the structural change of the impact connected
with the financial crisis, considered previously in Column (8) of Table 1, was insignificant with other
inequality indicators.
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variables from further specifications.
Besides the usual statistics, including the parameter estimates and their stand-
ard errors provided in regular brackets, the square brackets in Table 2 report beta
coefficients–the coefficients from the standardized regression– which are informative
about the relative response of each variable in terms of standard deviations. The find-
ings do seem to suggest that the effect does not come equally from the whole income
distribution. First, the external pressure indicator has a positive effect in all cases, but
is insignificant for the upper percentile ratio P9050. Second, even compared with the
significant LVAR and GINI coefficients, the beta coefficient of the external pressure
alone is seemingly larger in the case of P5010, which is connected to the lower part of
income distribution. Third, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is much
smaller for P5010 as compared with both LVAR and GINI, which implies a larger long-
term impact on inequality measured by the 50/10 ratio of income percentiles. This
asymmetry suggests that the impact of the Chinese trade pressure on inequality seems
to be concentrated at the lower part of income distribution. At the same time, the
results that we see in summary inequality measures like LVAR and GINI are likely to
be driven mostly by the lower half of the distribution. Nevertheless, the cut at the 50th
and 10th income percentiles might not be ideal (or, potentially, time varying), because
the pressure was found to be insignificant using P5010 with data before 2008 (not
reported), whereas it was significant using the same data with the LVAR and GINI
indices.
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4 Importance of other markets and intermediate
adjustment
So far, we have looked at the external pressure faced in export markets due to the
expansion of Chinese exports, excluding both the Chinese market itself and the do-
mestic market of the country of the region of interest. Also, we have taken a look
only at the basic equations without considering trade adjustment by firms of the af-
fected country/region. This can happen through various re-allocations of imports and
exports between different markets that, potentially, can reduce the pressure on firms
and, therefore, also inequality. Now we lift these restrictions.
4.1 Other markets
Motivated by an idea similar to those of Autor et al. (2013) and Feenstra et al. (2017),
we define the additional indicators aiming to capture the pressure faced in the domestic
market and the potential expansion of exports in the Chinese market. The indicator
for ‘domestic pressure’ is defined analogously to that for external pressure, just with
one (local) market39:
P(M)r,t = log
(
M
(from China)
i,t
Oi,t −Xi,t Ri,r,t
)
, (6)
where:
M
(from China)
i,t indicates imports from China to country i;
Oi,t is output of manufacturing goods in country i; and
Xi,t represents total exports of manufactured goods from country i to all coun-
tries.
The country-level pressure is equal to the import of manufacturing goods from China
39As in the definition of the external pressure (see Footnote 26), we omit the country index on the
left side.
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to country i divided by the local use of manufacturing goods.40 The regional pres-
sure index relies on the country-level one, distributing it to region r proportionally to
the share of manufacturing in local employment. Local use of manufacturing goods is
the difference between output and export of manufacturing goods. The pressure in-
creases with imports, but decreases with local production, because that implies a larger
domestic market share. One expects this effect to increase inequality, as increasing (re-
lative) imports might imply either a decrease of employment in local manufacturing or
a shift towards more advanced technology complemented by skilled employees who in
turn might command higher wages.
To account for the potential to export to the growing Chinese market, we intro-
duce the following two indicators. The first one uses the same principle as for the
external and domestic pressure indicators and defines the ‘China option’ based on the
ratio of exports from an EU country i to China (X
(to CN)
i,t ) to China’s total imports of
manufactured goods from all countries (M
(of China)
i,t ):
C(1)r,t = log
(
X
(to CN)
i,t
M
(of China)
t
Ri,r,t
)
, (7)
where, as previously, region r’s share of total manufacturing employment in country
i (Ri,r,t ) is used to distribute the impact to regions. This indicator represents the
opportunity to exploit the growth of the Chinese domestic market and thus increases
with exports to China while decreasing with all imports of China, as the opportunity
is relative to the total market. The idea here is that entering the WTO had a two-way
effect, making both Chinese goods and the Chinese market available to the rest of the
world.
We also use an alternative ‘China option’ indicator, where, instead of the potential
possibility and ability to export to China, as captured by the total Chinese imports in
the denominator of eq. (7), the actual share of exports to China of a country’s total
40We also explored the total production alone, manufacturing value added, or further refinement of
manufacturing output less exports without reexports in the denominator of eq. (6), which in all cases
gave similar results to those reported in the sequel.
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exports is evaluated by
C(2)r,t = log
(
X
(to CN)
i,t
Xi,t
Ri,r,t
)
, (8)
where the definition of variables remains the same as in eqs. (6) and (7).
It should be pointed out that, other than for the external and domestic pressure
indicators defined in eqs. (5) and (6), the China option’s influence on inequality is
less clear cut. Although in general it can be expected to reduce the trade pressure
faced elsewhere, if European exporters were competitive in the Chinese market, the
particular composition of products that are exported might matter as well.
Table 3 reports the estimation results, starting from the previously explored ex-
ternal pressure in Column (1). Columns (2)–(4) include the newly defined indicators
of domestic and Chinese markets individually. The domestic pressure is significant and
has a positive coefficient, whereas both Chinese market options are insignificant. Fur-
ther columns augment the basic model of the external pressure with the newly added
variables–first, individually in Columns (5)–(7), and then jointly in Columns (8)–(9)–
by including the respective pairs of the domestic market and the two China options.
The external pressure remains significant in all these cases, whereas the China option
remains insignificant, while the domestic pressure becomes insignificant, too. However,
the cases that include the external and the domestic pressure together, as in Columns
(5), (8), and (9), have a very distinctive pattern that points to the collinearity of
variables: the standard deviations (and the coefficient estimates) drastically increase
(about four to five times), and the domestic pressure, which was significant in Column
(2), not only becomes insignificant, but also changes the sign of its coefficient. And
indeed, the correlation coefficient between the external and domestic pressure indicat-
ors is almost 0.9. Therefore, only a linear combination of these two variables can be
precisely estimated with the actual data, while multicollinearity makes the estimates of
their individual effects highly imprecise due to the increased variance of the parameter
estimator.
This empirical feature, together with the economic arguments explicated in the In-
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troduction, motivated us to introduce a (dynamic) common factor of the external and
domestic pressure, as defined in Appendix C.1.41 One can understand it as a compos-
ite pressure indicator extracting the joint component from the external and domestic
pressures – it becomes necessary to identify some additional intermediate adjustment
effects, as otherwise, their joint usage together with the external and domestic pressure
indicators leads to the insignificance of all coefficients because of multicollinearity.
Columns (10)–(12) report the results of estimation with the dynamic common
factor: alone in Column (12) and augmented with the China option indicators in
Columns (11) and (12). Interestingly, across all the considered specifications, we find
no evidence during the analyzed period of the Chinese market becoming significantly
important, at least for changes of income inequality in the countries under considera-
tion.
The presented estimations with the common factor component reiterate the pre-
vious finding that the increase of income inequality in the EU15 regions due to the
Chinese pressure is significant. However, up until now, the estimations allowed every-
where for individual effects while excluding the potential importance of period effects.
Column (13) reports the results with both the individual and the period effects being
present; however, for it to be significant, a lagged pressure series is required that is
more significant than the contemporaneous one (see the discussion in Section 6).42 The
pressure effect remains significant, but both the standard errors and the estimated coef-
ficient of the pressure become much larger and quite similar to those in Columns (5),
(8), and (9), where we previously witnessed the presence of multicollinearity. In fact,
the common factor P(F )r,t , or any other pressure indicator, and the period effects should
be quite collinear: as Figure 3.1 revealed, a large part of the identification of the China
41We also considered the principal component analysis of the two pressure indicators and used the
first principal component (PC1), explaining 92% of total variation of external and local pressure. In
qualitative terms, this gave an analogous result to the results reported with the dynamic common
factor but does not benefit from a clear interpretation of the joint index.
42We use contemporaneous series in the main specifications in order to simplify the presentation
and modeling and to reduce the potential over-fitting. Otherwise, a large number of modeling choices
emerge, e.g., which lags of other series to consider, whether to fix the same lag for all variables or
allow for different ones, which lag selection method to employ, etc.
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impact stems from the structural break in the trend of the pressure. Similar arguments
prevented Breemersch et al. (2017) from considering the period effects and trends in
their analysis altogether (in Section 6, we will also include the linear and quadratic
trends, but aiming more at proxying the potential technological change, if it were bet-
ter captured by trends than by the growth rate of innovations). In our opinion, the size
estimate of the Chinese pressure is more precise in the specifications without multi-
collinearity, whatever the reason, whether the joint consideration of several correlated
pressure effects or period effects.
4.2 Intermediate market adjustment effects
In the previous sections, we have considered the effect of trade pressure without taking
into account any potential adjustments. In this subsection, we take a look at the inter-
mediate adjustments connected with simple reallocation of trade between the Chinese
and third markets, potentially alleviating the pressure before any further economic
adjustments would be required in terms of amounts of production, labor, technology,
wages, etc.
Firstly, note that increased imports from China imply increased domestic competi-
tion with the country’s total imports only if imports from other (third) markets remain
at their previous level. If they are just substituted (crowded out) by the Chinese im-
ports, ceteris paribus, the competitive pressure might remain the same from local firms’
point of view. If this change of import sources in the final use of goods were taking
place, such effect needs to be evaluated complementarily together with the domestic
pressure created by China. We label it as ‘imports substitution’.
To allow for such a substitution in the equations, we introduce the relative weight of
imports from non-Chinese sources (M
(non-CN)
i,t ) compared to goods produced and used
locally:
S(1)r,t = log
(
M
(non-CN)
i,t
Oi,t −Xi,tRi,r,t
)
, (9)
where other variables are defined as previously. Note that the denominator here is the
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same as in the domestic pressure eq. (6), which allows the domestic pressure to be
reduced by the counteraction of the terms in the numerators of eqs. (6) and (9). The
domestic pressure and imports substitution defined by these equations are expected to
have opposite signs if such an effect is relevant.
Instead of allowing for the cancellation of the terms as above, we could also look
directly at the ratio by country i of imports from China (M
(CN)
i,t ) to those from other
countries (M
(non-CN)
i,t ), in a similar way to eq. (8):
S(2)r,t = log
(
M
(CN)
i,t
M
(non-CN)
i,t
Ri,r,t
)
. (10)
The significance of either S(1)r,t or S(2)r,t would point to the presence of some kind of
substitution effects. Note that the substitution effects discussed above are connected
solely with the domestic pressure and can moderate its effect, but cannot soften the
external trade pressure faced globally in exports markets.
Secondly, more affordable imports from China can also induce firms to rely more
heavily on cheaper intermediate products from China. This can make the final goods
produced in the EU more competitive globally, and we call such effect ‘exports facil-
itation’. To assess its importance, we introduce an indicator that increases with the
value of imported intermediate goods from China (M
(int-CN)
i,t ) relative to exports (or
production) from a given country:
F (1)r,t = log
(
M
(int-CN)
i,t
Xi,t
Ri,r,t
)
. (11)
The results with total manufacturing production in the denominator instead of exports
are analogous to those with F (1)r,t ; therefore, we do not report them. However, we may
also be interested in whether this result is driven by exports or more by the domestic
use of production, as captured by (Oi,t−Xi,t). To investigate this, we will also consider
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a ‘domestic facilitation’ indicator:
F (2)r,t = log
(
M
(int-CN)
i,t
Oi,t −Xi,tRi,r,t
)
. (12)
Finally, if the fast-growing Chinese market becomes increasingly attractive, firms
might want to reallocate their exports from other markets to China. The previously
considered China option indicator C(1)i,t might not capture this, e.g., if exports to China
grow at the same rate as Chinese imports. Therefore, similar to the pair of domestic
pressure and the substitution effect, the China option measure needs a complementary
indicator that would gauge the extent of exports to non-Chinese markets, which we
call ‘exports reallocation’. This reallocation would decrease with the weight of export
to countries other than China (X
(non-CN)
i,t ) relative to imports from China (M
(of CN)
i,t ),
and to capture this, we include
R(1)r,t = log
(
X
(non-CN)
i,t
M
(of CN)
i,t
Ri,r,t
)
(13)
which shares the same denominator with the China option C(1)i,t in order to allow for
the potential counteraction of the numerators. If such exports reallocation were tak-
ing place, then the China option and exports reallocation would be expected to have
coefficients of opposite signs.
Alternatively, and in a similar way to eqs. (8) and (10), we also consider a direct
metric of export reallocation defined by the ratio of exports by country i to China
(X
(to CN)
i,t ) and other countries (X
(non-CN)
i,t ):
R(2)r,t = log
(
X
(to CN)
i,t
X
(non-CN)
i,t
Ri,r,t
)
. (14)
It should be noted that R(2)r,t is closely connected with the C(2)r,t defined in eq. (8), which
has total exports in its denominator instead of exports to countries other than China
in eq. (14).
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In Table 4, we report the estimation results using the newly introduced indices.
Column (1) presents the basic specification with the composite pressure indicator–the
dynamic common factor of external and internal pressure–as in Column (12) of Table 3.
As it accounts for variations in both the external and the domestic pressure, we use it
hereafter together with additional indicators of intermediate market adjustments.
Subsequently, we first individually add the just-discussed import substitution, ex-
ports facilitation, and exports reallocation indicators in Columns (2)–(7), whereas
Columns (8) and (9) report the results of the joint estimation using the (most) signi-
ficant variables.
Column (2) indicates that import substitution, as measured by S(1)i,t , has a negative
and significant coefficient, reducing the increase in inequality. This is consistent with
the fact that the domestic pressure induced by China’s WTO accession was dampened
in the EU regions by the diversion of imports from other countries towards Chinese
products in the post-accession period. The second measure of import substitution (S(2)i,t )
is insignificant in Column (3) but makes the pressure coefficient insignificant, too.43
The export facilitation in Column (4) is also significant at the 10% significance level (the
same holds when the total production is used in eq. (11) instead of exports), whereas
there is no significant change from the ‘domestic facilitation’ perspective presented
in Column (5). Finally, none of the discussed indicators of exports reallocation is
significantly different from zero (see Columns (6) and (7)). This is also consistent with
the previous result that the indicators of the Chinese market option were insignificant
in Table 3.
In summary, when added individually, the coefficients of imports substitution and
exports facilitation indicators are significant and have the expected signs, thus indicat-
ing the presence of these market-switching adjustments. When the (most) significant
substitution and facilitation effects are considered jointly in Columns (8) and (9), they
become insignificant, whereas the coefficient of the pressure indicator remains signific-
43Although the coefficient of the substitution indicator is very small and has a much larger standard
error than that of the pressure indicator.
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ant. Finally, we should recall that, by construction, the most individually significant
substitution effect is connected solely with the domestic pressure through crowding out
of other foreign imports by Chinese imports, but it cannot compensate for the external
trade pressure faced globally in exports markets. This, besides a clearly observable
inflection point in the trend since 2002 discussed in Figure 3.1, was an additional mo-
tivation to use only the external pressure indicator in the stylized simulation of the
impact, presented in Appendix D.
5 Importance of impact channels: A semi-reduced
form
So far, we have looked at the impact in a reduced form which can be connected with
many economic mechanisms. In order to shed some light on their importance, we think
about the impact of China’s expansion as a two-stage process. First, the initial trade
pressure impulse affects some intermediate variables connected with different channels
of the impact. Second, these transmission channels affect the outcome (inequality)
itself, and we will take a look hereafter at the specific contribution of the components
we can measure. For the clarity of discussion, we will reverse the process by starting
from the second stage, i.e., the equation of impact channels.
Based on the discussion presented in the Introduction, we aim hereafter at evalu-
ating the relative importance of the following three potential channels through which
inequality changes: inter-sectoral shifts, intra-sectoral adjustments, taking place within
manufacturing, and increasing unemployment. For that purpose, we regress inequality
on the following ‘channel’ variables capturing the structural patterns of an economy:
manufacturing employment’s share of total regional employment, the regional unem-
ployment rate, the share of medium and high technological intensity of exports, and
two relative measures of the changing skills of the manufacturing workforce (see details
and stylized facts in Section E.3 in the Appendix). The first relates the share of higher
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education degree holders among all workers in manufacturing to the same share in all
sectors of the region, while the other relates the share of employees in white-collar jobs
in manufacturing to the same share in all sectors of the region.
The inter-sectoral shift is connected with workers who are dismissed from manufac-
turing, but find jobs in other sectors. Ceteris paribus, such a shift would be identified
by a reduced share of workers in manufacturing without an increase in unemploy-
ment. Hence, the manufacturing share and the unemployment rate jointly identify the
inter-sectoral shift and/or an increase in unemployment. Note that in all cases to be
considered next, we use the same instruments as previously in order to identify the
changes in all of these variables connected with the trade pressure and not with some
domestic developments. We use the upgrading of the technological intensity of exports
and the up-skilling of workers to identify the intra-manufacturing adjustments.
The estimation results are presented next in two tables. First, Table 5 reports
the projection of inequality on the variables listed above to identify the significant
ones. Second, Table 6 presents the results of projections of these channel/transmission
variables on the trade pressure indicator, in connection with the first stage of the trade
pressure impact. In both cases, we rely on the strategy already used in creating our
base estimates and project the channel variables on the same set of instruments as in
the fully reduced form to retain the correspondence of results explicated in Appendix
C.2.
Columns (1)–(5) in Table 5 explore the individual significance of the transmission
variables. All the coefficients here have the expected signs: negative for the manu-
facturing labor share and positive for the rest. Manufacturing share, unemployment
rate, and white collar workers are also immediately significant at the usual significance
levels. The individually considered contemporaneous variables of technological intens-
ity of exports and the share of workers with higher education are insignificant, but their
lags are significant (not reported). This might indicate that the pressure channeling
through manufacturing reduction and increasing unemployment starts almost instant-
aneously, whereas the upgrading of technology and the up-skilling of labor might lag
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somewhat after the initial trade pressure takes place. The estimation of joint effects
corroborates this intuition.
Columns (6)–(8) explore the significance of variables employed jointly and not in-
dividually. Using the backwards selection strategy to select the most informative vari-
ables, i.e., starting from all variables and iteratively dropping the least significant one,
it reports only the remaining variables that are significant at least at the 10% signific-
ance level. To evaluate the potentially lagging effects, we estimate the specifications
not only with the contemporaneous relationship in Column (6), but also with vari-
ables lagged once and twice in Columns (7) and (8), respectively. Consistently with
the previous prediction, only the manufacturing labor share and the unemployment
rate are significant in the contemporaneous specification in Column (6), whereas the
technological intensity of exports joins this combination after one lag, as reported in
Column (7). Finally, higher education also becomes significant in Column (8) when we
allow for its interaction with the technological intensity of exports. The share of white
collar workers, despite being significant individually in Column (4), does not become
significant in specifications with many variables.
Two additional aspects should be stressed. First, Column (7) is not only the best
specification when we fix one lag of explanatory variables, but it is also produced by
the backwards selection strategy from all considered lags when only linear terms are
included. Second, the appropriate lags of the pressure indicator are insignificant if
added to the specifications in Columns (6)–(8). If a substantially significant channel,
through which the pressure indicator affects inequality, were missing, the pressure
indicator would be expected to become significant under such specifications.
43
T
ab
le
5:
R
el
ev
an
ce
of
im
p
ac
t
ch
an
n
el
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
bl
e:
In
co
m
e
in
eq
u
al
it
y
(L
V
A
R
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
L
a
g
of
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s:
la
g
=
0
la
g
=
1
la
g
=
2
L
a
g
o
f
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
0.
47
0
∗∗
∗
0.
50
9∗
∗∗
0.
45
5
∗∗
∗
0.
53
2
∗∗
∗
0.
57
6∗
∗∗
0.
41
6∗
∗∗
0.
30
9
∗∗
∗
0.
20
8∗
∗
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.0
92
)
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
la
b
o
r
sh
a
re
−0
.3
46
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
69
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
58
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
62
∗∗
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.1
13
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
0.
18
7∗
∗∗
0.
17
9∗
∗∗
0.
18
5
∗∗
∗
0.
19
5∗
∗∗
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
70
)
T
ec
h
n
.
in
te
n
s.
of
ex
p
o
rt
s
(T
E
C
H
)
0.
40
8
0.
53
5∗
∗
0.
59
2
∗
(0
.2
63
)
(0
.2
53
)
(0
.3
29
)
W
h
it
e-
co
ll
a
r
w
or
k
er
s
0.
40
2∗
(0
.2
22
)
W
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
er
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(H
E
D
U
)
0.
13
9
1.
26
1
∗∗
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.1
27
)
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
:
H
E
D
U
∗T
E
C
H
0.
25
7
∗∗
(0
.1
27
)
P
-v
a
l.
(H
an
se
n
)
0.
44
7
0.
24
1
0.
19
7
0.
25
4
0.
21
8
0.
43
1
0.
63
8
0.
48
3
P
-v
a
l.
(A
R
1
)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
P
-v
a
l.
(A
R
2
)
0.
43
8
0.
35
9
0.
60
8
0.
42
0.
35
1
0.
58
4
0.
65
9
0.
76
6
R
eg
.
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
In
st
r.
n
o
.
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46
O
b
s.
88
7
88
7
96
8
88
6
85
9
88
7
80
2
71
7
N
o
te
:
∗ p
<
0.
1;
∗∗
p
<
0.
05
;
∗∗
∗ p
<
0.
01
44
In summary, the established significance of the considered channel variables is com-
patible with a combination of inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral mechanisms: inequality
is affected not only by the shrinking manufacturing sector and increasing unemploy-
ment, but also by the technological upgrading of manufacturing exports together with
upskilling of employed labor.
As the results provided above were identified through the projections on instru-
ments, the significance of variables is informative about the relevance of different chan-
nels. Nevertheless, besides their statistical significance, we aim at evaluating their
relative importance. Therefore, we additionally present not only the beta coefficients
in Table A7 in Appendix B, which reveal the size of responses to standardized changes
in the channel variables, but also the response of each variable employed above to the
trade pressure itself. Table 6 next reports these results using the common factor (P(F )r,t )
of the external and domestic pressure, with the following abbreviations used therein:
MSHR – labor share in manufacturing, UNRT – unemployment rate, TECH – techno-
logical intensity of exports, WHCO – share of white-collar workers, HEDU – share of
labor with higher education.
Apart from the unemployment rate variable to be discussed shortly, all other coef-
ficients have the expected signs and are significant. It should be noted that, unlike
the unemployment rate, the structural break connected with the financial crisis was
insignificant for the remaining variables. The reported equations for the unemployment
rate are problematic. First, whenever the structural break is introduced in Column (3),
the pressure coefficient before the crisis becomes negative. Even though it is positive
during the aftermath of the financial crisis, the unemployment-reducing trade pressure
effect before the crisis is somewhat counterintuitive.44 Second, and more importantly,
the validity of over-identifying restrictions by the Sargan-Hansen test statistic is re-
jected, which casts doubt on the consistency of its estimation. We tried to solve this
44Although it is not impossible. For instance, consider the case where the trade pressure is connected
with some ‘creative destruction’ process and induces the emergence of new firms to produce new
products that penetrate broader markets. At the same time, the dismissed workers could also become
more mobile in regional and/or sectoral terms. This would allow the booming sectors to extend or
start new projects employing additional labor during the upswing of economic activity.
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Table 6: Initial responses to primary trade pressure
Dependent variable:
MSHR UNRT TECH WHCO HEDU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag of dependent variable 0.705∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.102 0.354∗
(0.059) (0.046) (0.047) (0.152) (0.160) (0.196)
Common factor P(F )r,t −0.024∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
P(F )r,t ∗ 1{t ≥ 2008}) 0.103∗∗∗
(0.040)
y2008 −0.083
(0.090)
P-val.(Hansen) 0.25 0.051 0.036 0.17 0.207 0.558
P-val.(AR1) 0 0 0 0.007 0.022 0.008
P-val.(AR2) 0.073 0.864 0.393 0.37 0.497 0.653
Reg. 65 65 65 65 65 65
Instr.no. 46 46 46 46 46 46
Obs. 1087 1087 1087 1158 1083 1042
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
issue by increasing autoregressive lags, varying and considering more lags of the pres-
sure indicator, looking for other non-linearities, and introducing additional controls,
including trends, economic sentiment indicator, exchange rates, but without success45.
We therefore report the decomposition results next with both specifications, hoping
that the true impact is somewhere in between the two. However, one has to keep this
potential caveat in mind when interpreting further results. The positive side is that,
irrespective of the particular specification employed for the initial impulse equation
of the unemployment rate, the decomposition pattern obtained with respect to other
indicators remains the same.
As defined in Appendix C.2, the initial responses together with the channel equa-
45It should be noted that we do not change the set of instruments, because this would invalidate
the decomposition defined in Appendix C.2.
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tion determine the decomposition, where the total long-run impact is split into terms
associated with each channel variable. Based on it and the results reported in Tables
5 and 6, Figure 2 reports the estimated total long-run impact of the trade pressure
on inequality, together with its share explained by the inter-sectoral shift (through
the reduction of the share of labor in manufacturing), the intra-sectoral adjustments
(through the increasing technological intensity of exports and/or upskilling of the em-
ployed labor force), and the increasing unemployment rate. In Figure 2, they are
abbreviated as INTER, INTRA, and UNEMPL, respectively. In correspondence with
Columns (6)–(8) of Table 5, the decomposition is provided for the impact without any
lag (lag=0), with one lag (lag=1), and with two lags (lag=2). The upper and lower
panels of the figure use the specifications of the primary impact on unemployment rate
as in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6, respectively. The radius of circles corresponds
to the total long-run impact that is reported in the brackets below each lag.46
All decompositions are in accordance with the fact that, initially, i.e., at lag=0,
the largest adjustment takes place through the inter-sectoral channel (the shrinking
manufacturing sector). The unemployment channel became important only after the
financial crisis and also increased the total impact, but its share among the trans-
mission channels is still smaller than that of the inter-sectoral shift. As time passes,
the intra-sectoral adjustments not only become significant at lag one but also become
dominant at lag two, further increasing the total long-run impact of the trade pres-
sure on inequality. Thus, over the span of two years, the intra-sectoral adjustments
become the main source of income inequality, overwhelming the initially predominant
inter-sectoral shift.
46It should be pointed out that, despite the sample variations induced by differences in data avail-
ability of various variables, the calculated total long-run impact corresponds well with that estimated
directly from the reduced form. For instance, the top-left panel in Figure 2, linked to the case of
lag=0 of the semi-structural approach, produces a total impact of 0.055. The reduced-form equation
that corresponds to this case is given in Column (12) of Table 3, where the derived long-run impact
is approximately 0.052 (≈ 0.0231−0.561 ).
47
Figure 2: Importance of impact channels
UNEMPL 
 (7.7 %)
INTER 
 (92.3 %)
lag = 0 
 (total impact = 0.055)
UNEMPL 
 (6.6 %)
INTER 
 (74.2 %)
INTRA 
 (19.2 %)
lag = 1 
 (total impact = 0.056)
UNEMPL 
 (4.5 %)
INTER 
 (35.5 %)
INTRA 
 (60 %)
lag = 2 
 (total impact = 0.075)
UNEMPL 
     (45.5 %)
INTER 
(54.5 %)
lag = 0 
 (total impact = 0.094)
UNEMPL 
     (41.4 %)
INTER 
(46.5 %)
INTRA 
(12 %)
lag = 1 
 (total impact = 0.09)
UNEMPL 
     (32.3 %)
INTER 
(25.2 %)
INTRA 
(42.5 %)
lag = 2 
 (total impact = 0.106)
Note: the upper and lower panels use the primary impulse specifications of unemployment rate
given in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6, respectively. The lower panel presents the results with the
financial crisis effect, i.e, obtained under 1{t ≥ 2008} = 1. The radius of circles corresponds to the
total long-run impact that is reported in the brackets below each lag. INTER stands for inter-sectoral
shift, INTRA for intra-sectoral adjustments, and UNEMPL for a move to unemployment. The total
impact here represents the long-run impact, which takes into account both the immediate partial
impact and adjustments through the lagged dependent variable (see Appendix C.2).
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6 Robustness checks and economic significance
In the sequel, we perform five robustness checks, which cover the estimations with
varying numbers and types of instruments, lagging and period effects, and the usage of
different regional projections, alternative estimators, inequality measures, intermediate
adjustments, and a number of additional control variables. Here, we only discuss the
main findings, referring further to Appendix B for the respective particular tables
containing the estimation results.
First, we explore the importance of the number of instruments. In the basic es-
timation, the number of instruments made up approximately 70% of the number of
cross-sections (regions). Shrinking the number of instruments by more than half (to
about 33%) is considered in Table A1 (even further reduction to 9% will be discussed
shortly). Practically, this leaves all the previously established results intact. The
noticeable change in terms of significance is present only in Column (11), where the
number of parameters under estimation is larger and only manufacturing’s share and
the technical intensity of exports remain significant, while other terms become insig-
nificant. Even in this case, the point estimates of coefficients are very similar to those
reported in Column (8) of Table 5.
Second, we investigate the importance of the composition of instruments in Table
A2, at the same time reducing further the total number of instruments to just six.
To achieve this we not only use the collapsed GMM instruments, but also include
only one type out of the previously defined three variants of instruments given by
W (i), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, as defined in eqs. (2)–(4), and using a single third country for
comparison with China’s trade performance. First, Japan is employed as the largest
economy and the trade partner of the considered three (Japan, Korea, and India).
Next, although we expected theoretically in Section 2.3 that Asian countries would
be more fit to form the instruments, Table A2 shows that similar results are obtained
also when US trade data are used to form the instruments. In all cases, the coefficient
of China’s impact remains positive and significant. Thus, the finding of the increase
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in income inequality in the (former) EU15 regions due to the pressure from China’s
WTO accession does not seem to depend neither on the number of instruments or on
its particular composition.
Third, we check if the results are robust to the particular regional projection that we
employed in eq. (5). There, relying on the fact that the country-level China pressure
was insignificant in explaining the variation in the regional share of manufacturing
employment out of total national employment in manufacturing, we used the actually
observed Ri,r,t for the distribution of the pressure. In Table A3, we show further that
our main findings are robust to imposing Ri,r,t = Ri,r,t0 for t > t0 = 2000 for projections.
Namely, we used the shares in the pre-accession year for projections of the country-level
trade pressure. This seems to be admissible, as these regional shares vary slowly over
time. The results here again remain very similar to the previously reported ones.
Fourth, as presented in Table A4 using the fully reduced form, the size and sig-
nificance of the impact coefficient would even increase if one allowed for the lagging
impact of the trade pressure and/or period effects.47 Hence, the impact calculations
that rely on the specification with the contemporaneous pressure can be considered
more as a lower bound. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 4, the sharp increase in
the coefficient of the pressure when the period effects are taken into account might also
be induced by multicollinearity.
Fifth, we augment the reduced-form specification with a number of other control
variables in Tables A5 and A6. In the former, we control for potential effects of tech-
nological development. For that purpose, the regional (log) levels and growth rates of
patent applications (per million inhabitants) as well as linear and quadratic trends are
included in addition to the trade pressure indicator. Furthermore, to check if there is
some interaction between patents or their growth rate and Chinese trade pressure, we
also include the respective interaction terms. Although the level of patents and the
quadratic trend are also significant in Columns (1) and (6) of Table A5, the trade pres-
47Note that to keep the number of instruments at the admissible level when period effects are
included, we proportionally shrink the number of other GMM and regular instruments.
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sure indicator also remains significant and even somewhat higher than without these
controls. The patent growth rates are insignificant in Columns (3) and (4). A separate
word is needed about the result presented in Column (2), where the interaction between
the number of patents and Chinese pressure is added. The pressure indicator here be-
comes apparently insignificant. However, the pressure and the interaction terms are
highly correlated by construction (with a correlation coefficient of 0.95). Furthermore,
the coefficient of the interaction term is tiny, with a much higher standard deviation,
which would suggest its irrelevance. If it is dropped, one gets back to the situation
depicted in Column (1).
Table A6 checks the sensitivity of the main results when other control variables are
added. First, the real effective exchange rate and economic sentiment index are added
in Columns (1) and (2), which previously were considered only with the external pres-
sure (P(X)r,t ), while here they are used with the dynamic common factor (P(F )r,t ). These
additional controls are again insignificant. In Column (3), the (logarithm of the) share
of service exports is included for a rough evaluation of whether the potential reori-
entation to service exports could have softened the pressure faced in goods markets.
Although the sign is negative, it is insignificant. Next, Columns (4)–(6) briefly investig-
ate the hypothesis that the EU’s expansion with the CEE countries in 2004 caused the
inequality increase and not China’s WTO accession: first, by creating a similar trade
pressure, and, next, because the free movement of labor increased migration flows that
created a downwards pressure on the wages of the poorest in the relatively richer EU15
countries, thus increasing inequality there. In Columns (4) and (5), we indeed see a
significant impact, with the latter confirming the just-explicated hypothesis, but the
Chinese trade pressure indicator remains highly significant. It apparently loses signi-
ficance when the interaction is introduced of the trade pressure with the year 2004 in
Column (6). However, it is not because of the EU’s expansion in 2004 with the CEE
countries, but because the Chinese pressure’s increasing impact on income inequal-
ity in the (former) EU15 countries only began to realize significantly since 2002 (see
Column (7) in Table A6), i.e., after China’s accession to the WTO. Namely, when an
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indicator of post-Chinese accession is included, taking a value of one since 2002 and
zero otherwise, the indicator of post-CEE accession, which takes a value of one only
since 2004, becomes insignificant. Furthermore, the size of the estimated impact here,
i.e., in the aftermath of China’s accession, is again larger than that witnessed using
the whole sample without taking this structural break in to account.
We finalize the discussion in this section with a brief summary of the economic
significance of the impact, while further details and simulation results are provided
in Appendix D. To quantify the impact, we exploit the structural break observed in
the country-level pressure indicator, extending the trend-line observed before 2002 to
after China’s WTO accession period (see Figure A7 in Appendix D), which we use as a
counter factual baseline. Then, exploiting the fully reduced estimate given in Column
(8) of Table 1, we calculate the dynamic path of the impact as defined by eqs. (25)–
(26) in Appendix D. The dynamics of the predicted absolute increase in inequality
are plotted in the top-right panel of Figure A8 using a box-plot of regional values,
whereas the ranking of all regions by the predicted increase in 2011 is presented in the
top panel of Figure A9. The comparison of the calculated increase that we assign to
China’s impact with the actual change in inequality since China’s WTO accession is
presented in the bottom panel of Figure A8: the left side plots the box-plots of the
two, whereas the right side plots the ratio of the respective medians. The median of
the actual increase in regional inequality since the China’s WTO accession in 2001
was about 0.03 and 0.06 in 2007 and 2011, respectively. The median of the predicted
increase in inequality levels due to Chinese trade pressure is 0.013 and 0.027 in 2007
and 2011, correspondingly. This constitutes about 40% of the actual increase. If
compared to a hypothetical counter-factual of ‘no-accession baseline’, the log-variance
of income is typically (the median across regions) larger by 5% in 2007 and by 9% in
2011, ranging, in 2007, from 2% in Spain to 7% in the UK, and, in 2011, from 5% in
Spain to 13% in Ireland.
These results rely on the reduced-form specification that takes into account the
presence of the structural break in the impact due to the financial crisis, as presented
52
in Column (8) of Table 1. If one disregarded it, using the simplest specification as
in Column (3) of Table 1, the impact up until 2007 would remain about the same
(just marginally smaller), whereas that in 2011 would be smaller by about half of the
currently reported difference between impact values in 2011 and 2007. The relative
ranking of countries is barely affected.
7 Summary and conclusions
“The only obligation for WTO Members is that they must accord China so-called
permanent MFN (‘most favoured nation’) status, entitling it to be treated in the same
way as every other WTO Member, unless exceptions are specified in the protocol of
accession. As the EU has always accorded China this status in any event, there will
be virtually no practical impact” (see Snyder, 2009, p. 1069).
This prediction turned out to be incorrect, as it did not take into account the fact
that the change in conditions of trade between China and third markets outside the
EU affects the demand of goods and services exported from the EU to those third
markets. Furthermore, the large increase in the amount of total output due to the
global expansion of Chinese exports reduced the unit cost of production, thus allowing
for a competitive improvement in terms of lower prices, even in the markets where
there were no changes of formal trade conditions in terms of tariff and/or non-tariff
barriers.
China’s accession to the WTO exerted substantial pressure on producers in the
EU. They faced intense Chinese competition in not only the domestic but also the
export markets globally. The induced adjustments of exports and domestic production
also have implications for the labor markets, partly because of directly changing total
demand for labor, especially in the manufacturing sector, partly because of changing
demand for different skills needed in the new environment. This structural change may
create winners and losers, potentially resulting also in higher income inequality.
Using net household equivalized income adjusted for purchasing power differences,
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we show that China’s accession indeed had a statistically significant positive impact on
income inequality in the (former) EU15 regions. The estimated impact is concentrated
in the median to lower tail of regional income distributions, which is similar to findings
obtained by Basco et al. (2017) for France.
We find that the most significant impact on inequality stems from the external
pressure faced in export markets and not the domestic one. As a consequence, we
would not recommend evaluating the impact of Chinese trade pressure in individual
EU countries by considering solely the domestic pressure. In our sample, there is
no significant indication that the growing Chinese market would compensate for the
consequences of the pressure faced elsewhere. However, we obtained some evidence
that the substitution of imports from third countries by Chinese goods and the use of
more affordable intermediate products from China relative to the EU’s exports softened
the initial pressure on income inequality.
Initially, the established increase in inequality within the EU regions is dominated
by the inter-sectoral shift, manifesting through the shrinking shares of labor employed
in manufacturing (without a significant increase in unemployment). The unemploy-
ment rate became a significant contributor to inequality only after the financial crisis,
which might indicate either that the initial shock due to the WTO accession was
augmented further by the financial crisis or that the trade pressure’s impact on in-
equality varies along the business cycle. Over the longer period, the intra-sectoral
(intra-manufacturing) adjustments become the largest contributor to income inequal-
ity through the technological upgrading of exports (and production) together with the
up-skilling of the employed labor.
As a simple simulation reveals, the established impact is not only statistically sig-
nificant, but also economically important. In relative terms, as compared with a hy-
pothetical ‘no-accession baseline’, the log-variance of income is typically 5% larger in
2007 and 9% larger in 2011. In absolute terms, the median of the actual increase in
regional inequality since China’s WTO accession in 2001 was about 0.03 and 0.06 in
2007 and 2011, respectively. The predicted median absolute increase in inequality due
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to Chinese trade pressure was 0.013 and 0.027 in 2007 and 2011, correspondingly. This
constitutes about 40% of the actual increase. It should be pointed out that inequality,
in terms of the considered household equivalized income, tended to decrease in the EU
regions before 2001, while the trend reverted afterwards.
The largest absolute increase was determined for regions from the UK, Belgium,
Italy, Austria, and Ireland. The largest impact relative to the no-accession baseline
was observed in Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, and the UK. Consistently with Dauth
et al. (2017), the predicted impact for German regions is typically among the smallest
ones. We find the UK regions to be among the most affected ones, which reinforces the
likelihood of the results in Bell and Machin (2016) and Colantone and Stanig (2018)
on the potential importance of the China shock for Brexit.
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A Appendix: Motivating stylized facts
Figure A1: Changes in world export shares and EU regional inequality
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Source: own calculations using various data sources. The IMF BOP data were used to derive the
export shares presented in the left panel. ECHP, EU-SILC, GSOEP, and BHPS were employed for
inequality (see Appendix E for details).
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Figure A2: Ratios of exports of goods from China and a selected country to the US
(top panel) and the EU15 (bottom panel) markets
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Figure A3: Average growth rates of export of goods and services in EU15 countries
5
10
15
country
gr
ow
th
 (in
 %
) 
AT BE D
E
D
K EL ES F
I
FR IE I
T LU NL PT SE UK
1995_2001
2002_2007
2002_2014
Source: own calculations based on the IMF BOP data.
63
B Appendix: Robustness and other sensitivity checks
List of tables in Appendix B:
Table A1: Results with a smaller number of instruments: ∼33% of the number of cross-
sections
Table A2: Results with separate types and a smaller number of instruments: ∼9% of the
number of cross-sections
Table A3: Results with regional projections fixed at Ri,r,t = Ri,r,t0 , for t > t0 = 2000
Table A4: Results with lagged pressure indicator and period effects
Table A5: Results with additional control variables: patents and trends
Table A6: Results with additional control variables: macroeconomic conditions, service ex-
ports, and the EU expansion with the CEE countries
Table A7: Relevance of the impact channels: beta coefficients from regressions with stand-
ardized variables
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C Appendix: Econometric considerations
C.1 Dynamic common factor: Extraction model and empir-
ical characterization
Using the MARSS() function from the R package MARSS (see Holmes et al., 2020), the
dynamic common factor (P(F )r,t ) is derived from the following state-space representation:
P˜(X)r,t
P˜(M)r,t
 =
aX,r
aM,r
P(F )r,t +
ε(X)r,t
ε
(M)
r,t
 , (ε(X)r,t , ε(M)r,t )′ ∼ N

0
0
 ,
σ2X,r 0
0 σ2M,r

 (15)
P(F )r,t = P(F )r,t−1 + ζr,t, ζr,t ∼ N(0, 1), Corr(ζr,t, ε(i)r,t) = 0, i ∈ {X,M},
where:
P˜(X)r,t and P˜(M)r,t stand for the standardized external P(X)r,t and domestic P(M)r,t
pressure series, respectively;
σ2X,r and σ
2
M,r are the variances of the corresponding individual components ε
(X)
r,t
and ε
(M)
r,t ; and
aX,r and aM,r are the corresponding loadings of the common factor P(F )r,t , specific
to each separate region indexed by r.
Besides the extraction of the dynamic common factor of the trade pressure, system
(15) can also be used to obtain a linear prediction for the missing observations, i.e.,
where some data of the external and/or domestic pressure are missing.
Figure A4 provides some intuition about the importance of the (estimated) load-
ings. The top-left panel presents the distribution of aX,r, the top-right panel plots
the distribution of aM,r/aX,r, and the bottom-left panel characterizes σ
2
X,r in an ana-
logous manner, whereas the bottom-right panel depicts the distribution of σ2M,r/σ
2
X,r.
Typically, the loading of the external pressure aX,r is larger than that of the domestic
pressure, as aM,r/aX,r < 1 holds in most cases. The idiosyncratic component of the do-
mestic pressure is also much larger, i.e., σ2M,r > σ
2
X,r. This also shows that the external
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pressure is more informative about the common component than the domestic one in
the stochastic process defined by system (15), just as was expected using economic
arguments in the Introduction.
Figure A4: Density plots of regional values of the estimated parameters of system (15)
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C.2 The reduced and semi-reduced form with the calculation
of the importance of channels
To simplify the presentation, we consider a stylized representation of the reduced-form
equation with a single pressure indicator, say Pr,t, and without individual effects or
other control variables:
α(L)Ir,t = βPr,t + ξr,t, E(ξr,t|W r,t) = 0, (16)
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where W r,t comprises a vector of instruments. Assuming that the polynomial α(L)
has no unit roots, the long-run impact of the pressure Pr,t on inequality is defined by
α−1(1)β from
Ir,t = α
−1(L)βPr,t + α−1(L)ξr,t, (17)
with its conditional expectation with respect to the instruments given by
E(Ir,t|W r,t) = α−1(L)β E(Pr,t|W r,t). (18)
The employed semi-reduced system that evaluates the contribution of channels
Z
(1)
r,t , Z
(2)
r,t , . . . , Z
(k)
r,t is given by
α1(L)Ir,t = θ1Z
(1)
r,t + θ2Z
(2)
r,t + · · ·+ θkZ(k)r,t + ζr,t, E(ζr,t|W r,t) = 0, (19)
λ1(L)Z
(1)
r,t = γ1Pr,t + v(1)r,t , E(v(1)r,t |W r,t) = 0,
λ2(L)Z
(2)
r,t = γ2Pr,t + v(2)r,t , E(v(2)r,t |W r,t) = 0,
...
λk(L)Z
(k)
r,t = γkPr,t + v(k)r,t , E(v(k)r,t |W r,t) = 0,
where the lag polynomials α1(L) and λi(L), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} are again assumed to have
all roots outside the unit circle. Note that we call this system ‘semi-reduced’ from the
economic point of view, as there is no simultaneity between the channel components
Z
(i)
r,t , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Here, we just use simple projections for the decomposition.
Using the inversion of polynomials in all the equations of the system, placing the
respective solutions of Z
(i)
r,t , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} into the first equation of system (19), and
74
taking the conditional expectation with respect to W r,t yields:
E(Ir,t|W r,t) = E
(
α−11 (L)
(
θ1Z
(1)
r,t + θ2Z
(2)
r,t + · · ·+ θkZ(k)r,t
)
|W r,t
)
= E
(
α−11 (L)
(
θ1λ
−1
1 (L)γ1Pr,t + θ2λ−12 (L)γ2Pr,t + · · ·+ θkλ−1k (L)γkPr,t
) |W r,t)
= α−11 (L)
(
θ1λ
−1
1 (L)γ1 + θ2λ
−1
2 (L)γ2 + · · ·+ θkλ−1k (L)γk
)
E (Pr,t|W r,t) .
(20)
Equating eqs. (18) and (20), canceling E (Pr,t|W r,t), and evaluating at L = 1 gives
the decomposition of the total long-run impact (α−1(1)β) into the parts associated
with the channel contributions:
α−1(1)β =
k∑
i=1
Ci. (21)
Here, the ith channel contribution Ci is given by
Ci = α
−1(1)λ−1i (1)γiθi. (22)
Given that α−1(1)β 6= 0 and Ci ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, eq. (21) allows for the
decomposition into shares
∑k
i=1
Ci
α−1(1)β and therefore directly reveals the importance of
different channels. The non-negativity holds in the cases underlying Figure 2. Here, the
manufacturing share’s case is of interest, because its gamma and theta coefficients are
negative individually, but their product is positive and satisfies the stated requirement.
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C.3 Appendix: Multi-year difference versus the GMM estim-
ation
Many of the key studies in the related literature (such as Autor et al., 2013, and
its followers) use long differences (taken over many years) in one way or another for
estimation, whereas we are using a panel of yearly data with the GMM estimator
in the first differences. In this subsection, we first discuss the choice of the yearly
GMM estimator, comparing it to three alternatives: (i) panels formed from overlapping
(moving) longer differences; (ii) an estimation based on differences, where the pre- and
post-impact differences over more extended periods are stacked (or other versions of a
panel structure where one uses non-overlapping subsample differences); and (iii), the
simple difference, where only the post-impact differences are employed. After discussing
why options (i) and (ii) are less efficient choices in our case, we still present the simple
estimation result based on approach (ii) without controlling for potential endogeneity
or the presence of other driving factors through the proper use of instruments, as
we do in the GMM. Importantly, the obtained estimate with this simple multi-year
difference approach is in between the GMM-based long-run estimates that take and do
not take the financial crisis into consideration, in connection with Columns (8) and (3)
of Table 1, respectively. Finally, we show how the simplistic approach in (iii) might be
erroneous whenever substantial cross-sectional variation dominates the contribution of
the pressure indicator.
The usage of a panel with overlapping samples over many years, as in the first
option stated above, is well known to result in a moving average error term of about
the same order as the number of years within the window (see Rowley and Wilton,
1973, Hansen and Hodrick, 1980). If one used moving averages of ‘longer differences’,
the error term would be substantially correlated with a lengthy lag of the depend-
ent variable, thus requiring the inclusion of a large number of autoregressive terms
(to approximate a high-order moving average process) or an explicit modeling of the
moving average component in the error process. Ignoring this problem would hinder
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statistical inference. It is barely possible to address this issue in our case because the
effective number of years is not large and has many gaps in the middle of the sample.
This approach is highly inefficient at best relative to the standard yearly panel GMM
approach, which does not suffer from serially correlated errors at higher-order lags.
In our case, only the first lag was problematic, just as it is expected to be with the
first differences approach in panels, whereas the second-order correlation was already
insignificant. Thus, by using the GMM, we can expect to get not only consistent, but
also more efficient estimates, as fewer data are lost due to lagged series/instruments,
whereas more data would be lost in the moving average approach with ‘long multi-year
differences’ by construction.
The second option that stacks the pre-impact and post-impact multi-year differences
does not have the above problem because the two differences do not overlap. It does,
however, reduce the number of observations quite substantially because only two (long)
periods contribute to the estimates (before and after the impact). The total number of
observations is only twice the number of the cross-sectional units, much less than what
the GMM uses with all available periods included. This loss of observations makes
the GMM more efficient. Furthermore, the dynamic panel specification allows us to
explicitly separate the immediate and long-run impacts.
In order to show the difference using our data, we present stylized facts and estim-
ates based on long differences. The left panel of Figure A5 plots the two multi-year
differences over two periods on which the estimation can rely. Blue color identifies the
difference before the impact; red and brown identify the second long difference. Be-
cause German regions do not have regional identifiers before 2002 in the original data
from the LFS, the second difference is somewhat shorter.48 We mark them in brown.
Notice that dropping the first part of data and using only the second difference alone
(see the right panel of the figure, which plots the same brown/red points, magnifying
the picture) would result in erroneous inference of an absent relationship.49
48We believe that this asymmetry should not create much difference, because right after China’s
WTO entrance, there was little impact if any.
49As region ‘DEC’ is a clear outlier and highly influential, we have removed it from the estimation
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Figure A5: Empirics with ‘long differences’
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Column (1) of Table A8 presents simple ordinary least squares estimates using the
stacked pre- and post-impact long differences (without controlling for any endogeneity
or omitted variable bias). This specification is akin to the one producing based estim-
ates in Column (3) of Table 1 with the GMM estimator. Observe that here the implied
long-run impact is 0.11, whereas the parameter estimate from long differences is close,
but somewhat larger (0.14). At the same, it is smaller than than the long-run impact
in the base GMM estimates when the potential impact of the financial crisis is taken
into account, as in Column (8) of Table 1. In this case, the estimated long-run impact
would constitute about 0.2.
Because only a small share of the total variance is explained by the model with
multi-year differences (less than 7%; see Column (1) in Table A8) and it is dominated
by the substantial cross-sectional variation, discarding information from before China’s
WTO accession is costly. Column (2) in Table A8 shows the long-difference estimate
of the critical parameter using post-accession data only. As expected, such estimates
are severely biased and very imprecise.
To show that this is not merely an artifact in our data, we performed a Monte
sample. The same results hold if one removes the outlying region ‘DK0’, Denmark.
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Table A8: Results with long differences: actual (∆LVAR) and simulated (∆y) data
Dependent variable:
∆LVAR ∆LVAR ∆y ∆y
(2 per.) (1 per.) (2 per.) (1 per.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GLOB 0.141∗∗∗ −0.072
(0.051) (0.117)
p 0.129∗∗∗ −0.065
(0.048) (0.110)
Constant −0.118∗∗ 0.154 0.086∗ 0.355∗∗
(0.047) (0.125) (0.045) (0.138)
Observations 108 63 130 65
R2 0.068 0.006 0.053 0.005
Adjusted R2 0.059 −0.010 0.046 −0.010
Residual Std. Error 0.235 0.215 0.417 0.404
F Statistic 7.739∗∗∗ 0.381 7.225∗∗∗ 0.347
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Carlo simulation that replicates the main features of the model discussed earlier.50 For
clarity, we keep the underlying data generating process simple (absent confounding
factors, endogeneity, and sector-specific effects). We generate the ‘pressure’ variable p
as
pi,t = exp{1{t>5} · 0.1(t− 5)}+ ei,t, ei,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 0.1),
and the dependent variable as
yi,t = 10 + 0.2 · pi,t + ui,t, ui,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 0.1),
where ei,t and uj,s are independent for all possible values of indices i, t, j, s. The number
of cross-sectional units is fixed at 65, while the number of periods is fixed at 13, with
the impact arriving in the sixth year.51
We summarize the simulation results in Figure A6. The pressure variable is in
the top-right and the dependent variable in the top-left panel; colors identify different
regions’ realizations over time. The lower panel replicates the situation observed earlier
in Figure A5 with the two long differences (before and after the impact) as in approach
(ii) and the single long difference using only the data since the initiation of the impact
(left and right panel, respectively) as in approach (iii). Note that even though the true
coefficient of the impact of p is 0.2, the latter suggests even a ‘negative tendency’. The
simple ordinary least squares estimation results we report in Columns (3) and (4) of
Table A8 are in line with what one can infer from these panels upon visual inspection.
Column (3) shows a highly significant estimate52. The estimate in column (4) gives an
insignificant coefficient with the wrong sign. Hence, option (iii) is not only inefficient
but also likely to be severely biased in general.
50The R code reproducing the results is available upon request. The discussion here relies on a
single realization (with set.seed(1)), but it is the typical one.
51In the empirical counterpart, these would correspond to the period from 1997 to 2008 with the
impact starting in 2002.
52Note that the hypothesis that the parameter equals the true 0.2 value cannot be rejected at the
usual significance levels: the p-value of such test is 0.14.
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Figure A6: Simulation with ‘long differences’
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
2 4 6 8 10 12
9.
5
10
.0
10
.5
11
.0
y = 10 + 0.2*p + e
period
y
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
p := pressure
period
p
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−1 0 1 2
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Long diff.: before and after
long change of p
lo
m
g 
ch
an
ge
 o
f p
l
l
periods: 5−1
periods: 13−5
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Long diff.: only after
long change of y
lo
ng
 c
ha
ng
e 
of
 p
D Appendix: Stylized calculation of the impact
To define the counter factual scenario of ‘no accession’, we exploit the structural break
observed in the country-level pressure indicator, extending the trend-line observed until
2001 also after China’s WTO accession. The left panel of Figure A7 plots (black circles)
the dynamics of the logarithms of actual data, i.e., log(P(XC)i,t ), after demeaning them by
country to remove the country-level fixed effects. The estimated baseline is presented
as a red line, with the 95% confidence bands in blue. Note that the counter-factual
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scenario is given by the scatter of country-specific values (in red), which is fixed at
2001 and extended following the trend-line for later years. The difference between the
(logarithms of) actual data depicted in black circles and the baseline-based red points
of the counter-factual is plotted in the middle panel of the figure and will constitute the
primary country-level trade shock, which hereafter is denoted by Ξ
(X)
i,t . To get a glance
at the dynamics of the shock with non-demeaned data, the right panel of Figure A7
plots the actual and the counter-factual (non-demeaned) logarithmically transformed
data obtained by adding back the country-specific means. In our opinion, a visual
fitting and extension by eye of the data before 2001, i.e., before China’s accession to
the WTO, would concur with the red dots of the counter-factual scenario rather than
with the sudden increase in actual values depicted by the black circles.
Next, we turn to the calculation of the impact. For that purpose, we use the
specification with the structural break in the impact due to the financial crisis, as
presented in Column (8) of Table 1. Recall that Ir,t denotes the logarithm of log-
variance of income and P(X)r,t = log(P(XC)i,t Ri,r,t). Let us write the equation representing
the logarithms of actual data and corresponding to Column (8) in Table 1 as
Ir,t = αIr,t−1 + (β0 + β1 · 1{t ≥ 2008}) · P(X)r,t + ur,t, (23)
where the remainder ur,t includes other terms of no interest for our calculations. As-
suming that neither it nor the parameters of the equation are affected by China’s
accession, the difference between the logarithms of actual values of inequality and the
values in the counter-factual scenario of ‘no accession’ (identified by a tilde) would be
given by
Ξ
(I)
r,t := Ir,t − I˜r,t = α(Ir,t−1 − I˜r,t−1) + (β0 + β1 · 1{t ≥ 2008}) · (P(X)r,t − P˜(X)r,t ). (24)
Hence, recalling that t0 denotes the pre-accession year, the dynamic impact over
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the post-accession period is given, in log-difference terms, by
Ξ
(I)
r,t0+h
=
h−1∑
j=0
αj
(
β0 + β1 · 1{t0 + h− j ≥ 2008}
) · Ξ(X)i,t+h−j, h ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, (25)
where it was exploited that
Ir,t − I˜r,t =

0, t ≤ t0
6= 0, t > t0
,
and
P(X)r,t − P˜(X)r,t = log(P(XC)i,t Ri,r,t)− log(P˜(XC)i,t Ri,r,t)
= log(P(XC)i,t /P˜(XC)i,t ) =

0, t ≤ t0
Ξ
(X)
r,t , t > t0
.
Consequently, using the log-difference defined in eq. (25), the ratio of the actual in-
equality to the hypothetical baseline (without a logarithmic transformation) is given by
exp(Ξ
(I)
r,t0+h
), whereas the change in the level of inequality (again without a logarithmic
transformation) in each post-accession year is defined by
∆r,t0+h = exp(Ir,t0+h)−exp(I˜r,t0+h) = exp(Ir,t0+h)·
(
1− 1
exp(Ξ
(I)
r,t0+h
)
)
, h ∈ {1, 2, . . . }.
(26)
The top-right panel of Figure A8 presents the dynamics of inequality change due
to China’s WTO accession (∆r,t), as calculated in eq. (26) using the primary shocks
to the external pressure Ξ
(X)
r,t , defined previously and plotted in Figure A7. Here, the
regional distribution is captured by the box-plot of the calculated regional increase in
inequality. The top panel of Figure A9 fixes the year to 2011 and shows the predicted
change in inequality for all regions in decreasing order of magnitude.
To get a further sense of the economic significance, we compare the dynamics of
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the predicted absolute increase with the actual changes. First, the top-left panel of
Figure A8 plots the actual inequality levels, measured in terms of income log-variance.
Each red dot represents the median of regional inequality values for a fixed year. The
bottom-left panel of Figure A8 then compares the box-plots of the actual increase
in inequality levels since 2000 with the change predicted by the previously described
procedure. Note that the range in orange color in the bottom-left figure corresponds
exactly to the interquartile range in the top-right panel of Figure A8, which also is of
the same color. The median levels of actual changes are depicted by the central black
dashes of each box. By taking the ratio, the bottom-right panel of Figure A8 relates
the median of the predicted values due to China’s WTO accession to the median of the
actual change since 2000. It reveals that even before the financial crisis, the predicted
Chinese pressure impact was sizable. It is also important to stress that the actual
inequality levels tended to decrease before China’s WTO accession in the considered
EU15 regions.
The lower panel of Figure A9 presents additional scatter-plots of actual vs. calcu-
lated changes in the log-variance of income over the periods 2000–2007 and 2000–2011.
It reveals that several UK regions are predicted to be among the most affected ones in
both 2007 and 2011.
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E Appendix: Details on data and rich stylized facts
E.1 Data on trade
The basis for our analysis of trade pressure is the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added
(TiVA) database.53 To calculate the external pressure indicator, we use some standard
geographical aggregates considered in the OECD TiVA database, taking into account
the intensity of trade with the EU as well as the geographic or socioeconomic prox-
imity of countries. Consequently, we consider the following eight aggregate export
destination markets: i) ASEAN countries, ii) Australia, India, Japan, Korea, iii) EU13
(EU28-EU15), iv) NAFTA, v) South America, vi) Russia and Turkey, vii) Switzerland,
Norway, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, viii) Rest of World. The last one is defined by
the difference between the total manufacturing exports and the sum of manufacturing
exports to destination markets i)-vii). Groups i)-v) are based mostly on the geograph-
ical/socioeconomic proximity of countries, whereas groups vi) and vii) are based more
on their trade intensity with the European countries.
For some descriptive statistics, we also use the IMF balance of payments (BOP)
statistics database and the OECD Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-
use (BTDIxE) database (ISIC Rev.4).54, which contains also the split of exports and
imports by technological intensity
E.1.1 The relative expansion of China’s exports in US and EU15 markets
The left panel of Figure A1 shows that China’s export share of world exports has
increased dramatically after its accession to the WTO by the end of 2001, while the
shares of the US, Germany, and France dropped. The relative increase of Chinese
exports persists also if considered in different markets. Figure A2 compares exports of
goods (all goods and only manufactured goods) from China and Germany, France, and
Japan to the US and the (former) EU15 destination markets. Since 2002, a structural
53To be found at http://oe.cd/tiva.
54To be found at https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=64755.
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break appears, which is somewhat more pronounced for manufacturing than all goods.
This pattern holds for many other countries (not reported).
It should be pointed out that not only the export shares of European and many
other countries started to dropping after China’s WTO accession, but also the growth
rates of total exports decreased (see Figure A3).
E.1.2 Changes in the technological (R&D) intensity of exports
Here, we provide some empirical evidence on the increasing technological intensity
in exports of intermediate goods, which is consistent with the importance of vertical
specialization induced by competition between developed and developing countries,
stressed by Krugman (2008). In order to avoid the purely global demand-driven changes
in exports structure, we consider the relative export shares, by comparing the share
of exports with different R&D intensity of a country to the respective share of world
exports of the same intensity.55
Figure A10: Changes in the share of high and medium-high technological intensity
intermediate goods in exports of the EU15 countries relative to the respective share of
world exports
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Note: The dashed line represents the median change value.
Source: own calculations based on the OECD bilateral trade statistics.
The relative share of the high and medium-high technological intensity interme-
55Since we do not have actual data on the composition of world exports by technological intensity,
we proxy these by those derived from all available countries in the OECD BTDIxE bilateral trade
statistics database.
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diates has increased during 2000-2007 in almost all countries, whereas there was no
such clear tendency during the 1995-2000 period and the median value (represented
by a dashed horizontal line) was close to zero both in this and the 2007-2014 period –
see Figure A10 on the preceding page. The dynamic pattern is thus consistent with a
potential upgrade of manufacturing exports of intermediate goods induced by China’s
accession to the WTO (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2016). It is worth stressing that such a
shift seems to be more connected with intermediates as we have not witnessed similar
changes for other products.
E.2 Data on inequality
In order to study inequality, we look at the target reference period of 1994-2014.56The
primary basis of our database is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP,
for 1995-2000) and the European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC, for 2003-2014).57 Both collect yearly individual-level microdata on the region
the household lives, demographic characteristics, income and living conditions for in-
dividuals in households. The two surveys share the same aim and try to be compatible
with each other. There are some methodological differences, but none of these affects
our analysis directly. Nevertheless, the timing of the two surveys implies that there are
no data for years 2001 and 2002.
Although Germany and the UK are part of both surveys, regional identifiers are
not present for them, and thus we decided to drop and substitute their data with those
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), respectively. Being the sources for the ECHP, both the BHPS and the
GSOEP have similar sample designs, resolution and income concepts. The conceptual
56Note that from now on we use ‘year’ and ‘period’ where we mean ‘reference year’ and ‘reference
period’. This distinction is important because almost all information on income and labor market
participation relate to the reference year, which is the year preceding the interview for all countries
except for the UK and Ireland (where it is the year of the interview).
57Note that the ECHP started in 1993, but we decided not to use years before 1994 as not all
variables needed were present. Also, note that not all countries are present in either the ECHP or in
the EU-SILC from the beginning.
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similarity of the EU-SILC and the ECHP provides a bridge to the former too.58 Unlike
other countries, data for Germany and the UK are available also for 2001 and 2002,
but they are still missing for the UK in 2009, where a new survey called Understanding
Society carries over from 2010.
The extent to which regional identifiers are recorded in the datasets are different,
some containing NUTS2 identifiers, some containing nothing at all. Besides using sup-
plementary data for Germany and the UK, this forced us to treat the Netherlands,
Portugal (islands merged) and Finland (A˚land merged) as a single NUTS1 unit be-
sides Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Portugal mainland which are one unit by definition.
Regional identifiers in all surveys are recoded to correspond to 2014 NUTS1 identifi-
ers.59
It is instructive to compare the size of the resulting regions to those of US states.
The 65 EU regions have a total implied population of 194 million persons in our sample
in 2010, while the 50 US states had a total of 310 million. Minimum, maximum, mean
and median were 0.5, 8.8, 3 and 2.4 in the EU and 0.5, 373, 6.2 and 4.4 million in the
US. Taking away the seven largest states (California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Texas), the US figures become 0.5, 9.9, 3.9 and 2.6, more similar to
those of the EU.
The income concept we use is household net per capita income, adjusted for house-
hold size using the modified OECD equivalence scale and for purchasing power differ-
ences using the price level indexes of Eurostat. Although this measure of income is
further away from the labor market than labor income and is thus subject to several
smoothing mechanisms, this is the only one that, using different data sources/surveys,
can be followed throughout all of the periods and in particular before and after China’s
accession to the WTO. Our sample units are individuals between the ages 25-60 to avoid
58Also some difficulties connected with German unification, apparent in the case of Germany are
better handled in the GSOEP – see (Frick and Krell, 2010).
59Because of insufficient information, we only recode the appropriate regions, but do not treat
boundary shifts in Greece between EL1 - EL5 and EL2 - EL6 respectively and in Italy between ITD
- ITH and ITE - ITI. See the history of changes at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/
history .
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peculiarities regarding the beginning and the end of a labor market career.
The above household surveys are usually not used for computing regional statistics,
but we argue that they are useful for this purpose. Household surveys seldom target
to be representative at other than the national level, representativeness meaning that
matching the sample averages of some key variables to an outside reference is an expli-
cit target of the survey (often with some mechanism to ensure this). Nevertheless, the
design of such surveys is complicated, often including multistage sampling and strati-
fication of the sample, which is useful in the current case. Stratification in general and
geographic stratification, in particular, is of help. It means that the national sample
is, in fact, a collection of subsamples within geographic regions, which happen to be
NUTS1 or an even lower level set of regions. We believe that if such sampling was used
to collect the data and the resulting sample size is sufficiently large for calculating
our indicator, we can trust that the regional inequality figures are useful. Even if not
representative, they are ‘random enough’ within a region so that all we have to worry
is the sampling and estimation precision.60
Because the exact sampling mechanism works differently in different countries and
surveys, we have taken a look at the sampling plans of the surveys we use. Again,
we have to keep in mind that Sweden, Ireland, Luxembourg and Denmark are by
definition, while the Netherlands, Portugal and Finland are by necessity constitute a
single NUTS1 region, therefore there is nothing to look at their case (there are more
than enough observations, and they are by definition representative). We only have to
worry about seven countries: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the
UK before 2000. In the case of the ECHP, the description in section 4.3 and Table
7 on page 29 of European Commission (1996) makes it clear that sampling involved
stratification at least at the NUTS1 level in all of the above cases, so we do not have
to worry. In the case of the EU-SILC, one has to consider the Quality Reports country
60A commonly used rule of thumb for calculating averages is to have at least 30-50 observations,
while less and less central distributional measures require more and more observations. In our case, we
have a few regions with one hundred observations, but in the vast majority of cases we have thousands.
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by country – we have chosen to look at the initial, 2006 ones.61 The discussion above
makes it clear that, except for Austria, sampling has involved stratification at the
NUTS1 level or below, so again, we do not have to worry. The Austrian one is a simple
random sample, which, in an extreme case can, but in a country with almost 9 million
inhabitants is unlikely to produce a regionally highly unbalanced sample at the NUTS1
level. As a countermeasure, subsection 2.1.8.3 points out, that the ‘adjustments were
carried out simultaneously on household and individual level and with reference to [. . . ]
region (nine categories: Nuts II level)’. Indeed: tabulating the population shares of the
regions reveals smooth transitions in time with weighted data, but some nonlinearities
(temporary drops/increases between 2004-2008). Still, the dispersion of weights across
regions remains moderate. We have checked the GSOEP and the BHPS individually.
In Germany, almost all subsamples are stratified by NUTS1 regions at least (that of
the GDR at the NUTS3 level) – see section 2 ‘Sampling of SOEP Subsamples A to
M3/4’ in Kroh et al. (2018). In the UK, stratification was based on postcodes (or if
there were fewer than 500 delivery points/addresses, groups of them) – see subsection
3.2.1.1 in Lynn (2006). Because there is a 1:1 mapping between postcodes and NUTS3
regions in the UK (and in other EU countries too), this implies NUTS3 stratification.62
Because our database is a composite one, we inspect its time-series properties to
see if there is reasonable continuity. Both income levels and the log-variance indicator
of income inequality show that continuity is reasonable – see Figure A11 on the next
page.
Broad stylized facts on the changes of inequality between the 1990s and the 2000s,
before and after the crisis indicate that these periods are characteristically different.
Between 1995 and 2000, inequality has not increased in most regions and has decreased
in many regions in Spain, Greece and Germany, among other countries – see Figure A12.
After 2000 however, inequality has increased in the majority of regions. Before the
crisis, the increases affected a wide range of regions, but not in all of them. After
61Available at https://circabc.europa.eu/ under Library / Quality assessment/quality reports.
62See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/correspondence-tables/
postcodes-and-nuts on the underlying mapping.
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its outbreak, however, practically all of them were affected, and the increases were of
greatest magnitude for those in the Mediterranean countries.
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Figure A12: Changes in income inequality, Manufacturing labor share, and unemploy-
ment rate in NUTS1 regions
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Note: due to the absence of previous years in the EU-LFS, the end- and starting year for Germany
on Figures in column 1 and 2 is 2002 instead of 2000.
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E.3 Data on employment
Publicly available databases do not contain sufficiently detailed and long historical time
series of employment levels and composition that we need, hence, we build these directly
from microdata. We use the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) to compile a
panel data of regions (modified NUTS1, as defined and harmonized in case of data on
inequality). Also here, we focus on employees aged 25 to 60 but do not restrict the
sample in other ways. The only difference is that, for Germany, the regional identifier
is available only since 2002 and we are forced to proxy the previous years with it63 .
Similarly to the EU-SILC, we argue for the reliability of EU-LFS data at the NUTS1
level, but here the argument is even stronger. Firstly, ‘All countries but Denmark use
the region, either at NUTS 2, NUTS 3 and NUTS 4 level or nationally defined areas,
as stratification variable’ – see page 7 of the EU-LFS quality report Eurostat (2017).
Secondly, the sample sizes are much larger than those in the EU-SILC, usually at the
order of several thousand observations, except some regions in Germany. Thirdly, we
are using the EU-LFS to calculate shares only, which does not have demanding data
needs.
Based on the employment data, one can observe that the share of manufacturing
employment in a region was quite stable in the second half of the 1990s, but had sig-
nificantly dropped in the 2000s – see Figure A12 on the preceding page. Similarly to
income inequality, this drop has deepened after the financial crisis, but from an already
lower level and at a slower pace. Considering the whole observation period, the con-
nection between inequality and the share of labor working in manufacturing/industry
appears to be negative and rather strong – see the first and second panel of Figure A13.
This seems to be connected with the fact that a broad Industry sector (B-E), which
comprises Manufacturing64, has typically the smallest within-sector inequality in EU15
countries (see the rightmost panel of Figure A13 on the next page).
63This is rather unfortunate as we use values for the pre-WTO-accession year 2000, for a basis of
comparison. We have tried to create the same data using the GSOEP, but because of its much smaller
sample size, we decided not to pursue this method.
64We rely on this rather than on manufacturing only as only this coarser category is available in
the ECHP and EU-SILC databases.
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It should be pointed out that the transition to Rev. 2 of the NACE classification
from 1 January 2008 onwards introduced a break in the time series of employment by
sectors. As, apart from Sweden, the EU-LFS provides the decomposition for 2008 using
both Rev.1 and Rev.2 of the classification, we use their ratio in 2008 to construct also
a re-scaled series that intends to diminish the impact of the change. Nevertheless, this
issue does not seem to have a substantial impact on our findings because the estimation
results are similar using unscaled and rescaled data, using data only up until 2007, or
allowing for the respective structural breaks.
Figure A13: Changes in regional income inequality and labor share in Industry (sectors
B-E)
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Source: own calculations from ECHP, EU-SILC, and EU-LFS microdata.
Finally, in Figure A12 on page 96 we take a look at the changes in unemployment
rate. We again compare the three periods as before. While the unemployment rate was
stable or decreasing in the first two periods, it has strongly increased in many regions
during the last (post-crisis) period (see the bottom panel of Figure A12 on page 96).
E.3.1 Skill upgrade in Manufacturing
A strive for higher productivity and/or a shift of production towards products of higher
quality and/or technological intensity might require higher skills of workers. To explore
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the potential presence of such behavior, we define two indicators using the share of
workers in Manufacturing having tertiary education, relative to the share of all workers
in a region having tertiary education,65 and the share of white-collar employees in
Manufacturing to the share of white-collar employees working in all sectors in the
region. We again consider the relative shares to control for a potential general shift
caused by other factors specific to the region (or even more globally66) and not only
the manufacturing sector in that region.
Figure A14: Changes in the relative share of employees with tertiary education (top
panel) and white-collar positions (bottom panel) in Manufacturing as compared to all
employees in an EU15 region.
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Source: own calculations based on the ELFS micro data.
The top panel of Figure A14 shows the relative share of employees with tertiary
65We also considered separation into lower-secondary and upper-secondary education, but these did
not reveal a pattern that would be as clear as the one observed in case of tertiary education.
66For instance, the globally increasing share of labor with higher education.
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education, while the bottom panel depicts the relative share of white-collar workers
in the EU15 regions. Even after controlling for the general trend in a region, theres
is a clear shift towards workers with higher education and white-collar occupations,
which is consistent with the general findings in Martinez Turegano (2020). Although
the difference is less clear cut, a somewhat larger increase in these labor upskilling
indicators seems to be present during 2000-2007.
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